Re: Should SEV-ES #VC use IST? (Re: [PATCH] Allow RDTSC and RDTSCP from userspace)
From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Date: 2020-06-23 11:07:37
Also in:
kvm, lkml
From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Date: 2020-06-23 11:07:37
Also in:
kvm, lkml
On Tue, Apr 28, 2020 at 09:55:12AM +0200, Joerg Roedel wrote:
On Mon, Apr 27, 2020 at 10:37:41AM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:quoted
I have a somewhat serious question: should we use IST for #VC at all? As I understand it, Rome and Naples make it mandatory for hypervisors to intercept #DB, which means that, due to the MOV SS mess, it's sort of mandatory to use IST for #VC. But Milan fixes the #DB issue, so, if we're running under a sufficiently sensible hypervisor, we don't need IST for #VC.The reason for #VC being IST is not only #DB, but also SEV-SNP. SNP adds page ownership tracking between guest and host, so that the hypervisor can't remap guest pages without the guest noticing. If there is a violation of ownership, which can happen at any memory access, there will be a #VC exception to notify the guest. And as this can happen anywhere, for example on a carefully crafted stack page set by userspace before doing SYSCALL, the only robust choice for #VC is to use IST.
So what happens if this #VC triggers on the first access to the #VC stack, because the malicious host has craftily mucked with only the #VC IST stack page? Or on the NMI IST stack, then we get #VC in NMI before the NMI can fix you up. AFAICT all of that is non-recoverable.