Re: [PATCH security-next v4 23/32] selinux: Remove boot parameter
From: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Date: 2018-10-02 19:48:04
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On 10/02/2018 12:17 PM, Kees Cook wrote:
On Tue, Oct 2, 2018 at 11:57 AM, John Johansen [off-list ref] wrote:quoted
Under the current scheme lsm.enabled=selinux could actually mean selinux,yama,loadpin,something_else are enabled. If we extend this behavior to when full stacking lands lsm.enabled=selinux,yama might mean selinux,yama,apparmor,loadpin,something_else and what that list is will vary from kernel to kernel, which I think is harder for the user than the lsm.enabled list being what is actually enabled at bootAh, I think I missed this in your earlier emails. What you don't like here is that "lsm.enable=" is additive. You want it to be explicit. Are you okay with lsm.order= having fallback?
yeah, if we are going to separate order, fallbacks are fine for anything that isn't specified. I am still not convinced that separating order from enablement is right, but its generally something a user should care about so I can live with it.
The situation we were trying to solve was with new LSMs getting implicitly disabled if someone is booting with an explicit list. For example: lsm.enable=yama,apparmor means when "landlock" gets added to the kernel, it will be implicitly disabled.
And here is the point of contention, I wouldn't call that implicitly disabled. The user explicitly selected a set of LSMs to enable. Having other LSMs enable when they aren't specified is confusing to a user, as now they have to consider what is enabled by default in the Kconfig. I think requiring distros/builders to consider Kconfig options is fine, but its a lot higher hurdle for regular users.
quoted
If we have to have multiple kernel parameter, I prefer a behvior where if you hav conflicting kernel parameters specified apparmor=0 lsm.enabled=apparmor that the conflict is logged and the lsm is left disabled, as I think it is easier for users to understand than the overrides scheme of v3, and sans logging of the conflict is effectively what we had in the past apparmor=0 security=apparmor or apparmor=1 security=selinux would result in apparmor being disabedOkay, so for this part you want per-LSM boot param to have priority (which seems to match SELinux's concerns), possibly logging the
hrmmm I wouldn't call it priority :) If you look at the above logic its a boolean AND operation. The LSM is only enabled if $LSM=1 AND security=$LSM all other combinations result in $LSM being disabled
conflict, but still accepting the apparmor= and selinux= state.
logging is nice for the user but certainly isn't required and is more than we are doing today
security= would still driving initialization ordering (so I think the behavior I have in the series would be correct).quoted
That being said I get we have a mess currently, and there really doesn't seem to be a good way to fix it. I think getting this right for the user is important enough that I am willing to break current apparmor userspace api. While apparmor=0 is documented we have also documented security=X for years and apparmor=0 isn't used too often so I think we can drop it to help clean this mess up abit. I am not going to Nak, or block on v3 behavior if that is considered the best path forward after this discussion/rant.I could define CONFIG_LSM_ENABLE as being "additive" to SECURITY_APPARMOR_BOOTPARAM_VALUE and SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE?
Oh sure lets deal with my complaint about too many ways to configure this beast by adding yet another config option :P seriously though, please no. That just adds another layer of confusion even if it is only being foisted on the distro/builder