On Tue, Oct 2, 2018 at 11:57 AM, John Johansen
[off-list ref] wrote:
Under the current scheme
lsm.enabled=selinux
could actually mean selinux,yama,loadpin,something_else are
enabled. If we extend this behavior to when full stacking lands
lsm.enabled=selinux,yama
might mean selinux,yama,apparmor,loadpin,something_else
and what that list is will vary from kernel to kernel, which I think
is harder for the user than the lsm.enabled list being what is
actually enabled at boot
Ah, I think I missed this in your earlier emails. What you don't like
here is that "lsm.enable=" is additive. You want it to be explicit.
Are you okay with lsm.order= having fallback?
The situation we were trying to solve was with new LSMs getting
implicitly disabled if someone is booting with an explicit list. For
example:
lsm.enable=yama,apparmor
means when "landlock" gets added to the kernel, it will be implicitly disabled.
If we have to have multiple kernel parameter, I prefer a behvior where
if you hav conflicting kernel parameters specified
apparmor=0 lsm.enabled=apparmor
that the conflict is logged and the lsm is left disabled, as I think
it is easier for users to understand than the overrides scheme of v3,
and sans logging of the conflict is effectively what we had in the
past
apparmor=0 security=apparmor
or
apparmor=1 security=selinux
would result in apparmor being disabed
Okay, so for this part you want per-LSM boot param to have priority
(which seems to match SELinux's concerns), possibly logging the
conflict, but still accepting the apparmor= and selinux= state.
security= would still driving initialization ordering (so I think the
behavior I have in the series would be correct).
That being said I get we have a mess currently, and there really
doesn't seem to be a good way to fix it. I think getting this right
for the user is important enough that I am willing to break current
apparmor userspace api. While apparmor=0 is documented we have also
documented security=X for years and apparmor=0 isn't used too often
so I think we can drop it to help clean this mess up abit.
I am not going to Nak, or block on v3 behavior if that is considered
the best path forward after this discussion/rant.
I could define CONFIG_LSM_ENABLE as being "additive" to
SECURITY_APPARMOR_BOOTPARAM_VALUE and
SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE?
-Kees
--
Kees Cook
Pixel Security