[kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v9 1/4] syscalls: Verify address limit before returning to user-mode
From: viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk (Al Viro)
Date: 2017-05-12 22:58:16
Also in:
linux-api, linux-s390, lkml
On Fri, May 12, 2017 at 05:47:55PM -0400, Rik van Riel wrote:
quoted
Seriously, look at these beasts.??Overwriting ->addr_limit is nowhere near the top threat.??If attacker can overwrite thread_info, you have lost.That is why THREAD_INFO_IN_TASK exists. It moves the struct thread_info to a location away from the stack, which means a stack overflow will not overwrite the thread_info.
... in which case such attacks on ->addr_limit also become a non-issue. AFAICS, we are mixing several unrelated issues here: * amount of places where set_fs() is called. Sure, reducing it is a good idea and we want to move to primitives like kernel_write() et.al. Fewer users => lower odds of screwing it up. * making sure that remaining callers are properly paired. Ditto. * switching to ->read_iter()/->write_iter() where it makes sense. Again, no problem with that. * providing sane environment for places like perf/oprofile. Again, a good idea, and set_fs(USER_DS) is only a part of what's needed there. * switching _everything_ to ->read_iter()/->write_iter(). Flat-out insane and AFAICS nobody is signing up for that. * getting rid of set_fs() entirely. I'm afraid that it's not feasible without the previous one and frankly, I don't see much point. * sanity-checking on return to userland. Maybe useful, maybe not. * taking thread_info out of the way of stack overflows. Reasonable, but has very little to do with the rest of that. * protecting against Lovecraftian horrors slithering in from the outer space only to commit unspeakable acts against ->addr_limit and ignoring much tastier targets next to it, but then what do you expect from degenerate spawn of Great Old Ones - sanity?