[kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v9 1/4] syscalls: Verify address limit before returning to user-mode
From: Kees Cook <hidden>
Date: 2017-05-12 05:34:37
Also in:
linux-api, linux-s390, lkml
On Thu, May 11, 2017 at 10:28 PM, Martin Schwidefsky [off-list ref] wrote:
On Thu, 11 May 2017 16:44:07 -0700 Linus Torvalds [off-list ref] wrote:quoted
On Thu, May 11, 2017 at 4:17 PM, Thomas Garnier [off-list ref] wrote:quoted
Ingo: Do you want the change as-is? Would you like it to be optional? What do you think?I'm not ingo, but I don't like that patch. It's in the wrong place - that system call return code is too timing-critical to add address limit checks. Now what I think you *could* do is: - make "set_fs()" actually set a work flag in the current thread flags - do the test in the slow-path (syscall_return_slowpath). Yes, yes, that ends up being architecture-specific, but it's fairly simple. And it only slows down the system calls that actually use "set_fs()". Sure, it will slow those down a fair amount, but they are hopefully a small subset of all cases. How does that sound to people? Thats' where we currently do that if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PROVE_LOCKING) && WARN(irqs_disabled(), "syscall %ld left IRQs disabled", regs->orig_ax)) local_irq_enable(); check too, which is a fairly similar issue.This is exactly what Heiko did for the s390 backend as a result of this discussion. See the _CIF_ASCE_SECONDARY bit in arch/s390/kernel/entry.S, for the hot patch the check for the bit is included in the general _CIF_WORK test. Only the slow patch gets a bit slower. git commit b5a882fcf146c87cb6b67c6df353e1c042b8773d "s390: restore address space when returning to user space".
If I'm understanding this, it won't catch corruption of addr_limit during fast-path syscalls, though (i.e. addr_limit changed without a call to set_fs()). :( This addr_limit corruption is mostly only a risk archs without THREAD_INFO_IN_TASK, but it would still be nice to catch unbalanced set_fs() code, so I like the idea. I like getting rid of addr_limit entirely even more, but that'll take some time. :) -Kees -- Kees Cook Pixel Security