Re: [patch 11/18] seccomp, treewide: Rename and convert __secure_computing() to return boolean
From: Jinjie Ruan <hidden>
Date: 2026-07-08 01:43:59
Also in:
linux-alpha, linux-arch, linux-doc, linux-m68k, linux-mips, linux-riscv, linux-s390, linux-sh, linux-um, lkml, loongarch, sparclinux
On 7/8/2026 3:06 AM, Thomas Gleixner wrote:
From: Jinjie Ruan <redacted> The return value of __secure_computing() currently uses 0 to indicate that a system call should be allowed, and -1 to indicate that it should be blocked/killed. This 0/-1 pattern is non-intuitive for a security check function and makes the control flow at the call sites less readable. Furthermore, any potential future changes to these return values would require a high-risk, error-prone audit of all its users across different architectures. Sanitize this logic by converting the return type of __secure_computing() to a proper boolean, where 'true' explicitly means 'allow' and 'false' means 'fail/deny'. Update all the two dozen or so call sites across the tree to align with this new boolean semantic. No functional changes are intended, as the callers still return -1 to the lower-level assembly entry code upon seccomp denial. Rename the function to __seccomp_permit_syscall() so that the purpose is entirely clear. [ tglx: Rename the function ] Suggested-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@kernel.org> Suggested-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Jinjie Ruan <redacted> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@kernel.org> Cc: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org> Cc: Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Guo Ren <guoren@kernel.org> Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org> Cc: Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@alpha.franken.de> Cc: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de> Cc: Yoshinori Sato <ysato@users.sourceforge.jp> Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at> Cc: Chris Zankel <chris@zankel.net> Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org Cc: linux-alpha@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-csky@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-m68k@lists.linux-m68k.org Cc: linux-mips@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-sh@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-um@lists.infradead.org --- arch/alpha/kernel/ptrace.c | 2 - arch/arm/kernel/ptrace.c | 2 - arch/arm64/kernel/ptrace.c | 2 - arch/csky/kernel/ptrace.c | 2 - arch/m68k/kernel/ptrace.c | 2 - arch/mips/kernel/ptrace.c | 2 - arch/parisc/kernel/ptrace.c | 2 - arch/sh/kernel/ptrace_32.c | 2 - arch/um/kernel/skas/syscall.c | 2 - arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c | 14 ++++++------- arch/xtensa/kernel/ptrace.c | 3 -- include/linux/entry-common.h | 9 +++----- include/linux/seccomp.h | 12 +++++------ kernel/seccomp.c | 35 +++++++++++++++++----------------- 14 files changed, 45 insertions(+), 46 deletions(-)
As Ada pointed out, the description of secure_computing in arch/Kconfig need to be updated, a possible suggestion:
--- a/arch/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/Kconfig@@ -636,8 +636,8 @@ config HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER - syscall_rollback() - syscall_set_return_value() - SIGSYS siginfo_t support - - secure_computing is called from a ptrace_event()-safe context - - secure_computing return value is checked and a return value
of -1 + - seccomp_permits_syscall is called from a ptrace_event()-safe context + - seccomp_permits_syscall return value is checked and if false Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/b8f3b5cd-8d8a-4396-ba0c-011a83234dd9@arm.com/ (local)
quoted hunk ↗ jump to hunk
--- a/arch/alpha/kernel/ptrace.c +++ b/arch/alpha/kernel/ptrace.c@@ -387,7 +387,7 @@ asmlinkage unsigned long syscall_trace_e * If this fails, seccomp may already have set up the return value * (e.g. SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO / TRACE). */ - if (secure_computing() == -1) { + if (!seccomp_permit_syscall()) { if (regs->r19 == 0 && regs->r0 == (unsigned long)-1) syscall_set_return_value(current, regs, -ENOSYS, 0); syscall_set_nr(current, regs, -1);
[...]
quoted hunk ↗ jump to hunk
-static int __seccomp_filter(int this_syscall, const bool recheck_after_trace) +static bool __seccomp_filter(int this_syscall, const bool recheck_after_trace) { u32 filter_ret, action; struct seccomp_data sd;@@ -1294,7 +1295,7 @@ static int __seccomp_filter(int this_sys case SECCOMP_RET_TRACE: /* We've been put in this state by the ptracer already. */ if (recheck_after_trace) - return 0; + return true; /* ENOSYS these calls if there is no tracer attached. */ if (!ptrace_event_enabled(current, PTRACE_EVENT_SECCOMP)) {@@ -1330,19 +1331,19 @@ static int __seccomp_filter(int this_sys * a skip would have already been reported. */ if (__seccomp_filter(this_syscall, true)) - return -1; + return false;
The return value of __seccomp_filter is checked in the wrong way, check -1 should be replaced with check false, maybe: - if (__seccomp_filter(this_syscall, true)) - return -1; + if (!__seccomp_filter(this_syscall, true)) + return false; otherwise, LGTM Reviewed-by: Jinjie Ruan <redacted>
quoted hunk ↗ jump to hunk
- return 0; + return true; case SECCOMP_RET_USER_NOTIF: if (seccomp_do_user_notification(this_syscall, match, &sd)) goto skip; - return 0; + return true; case SECCOMP_RET_LOG: seccomp_log(this_syscall, 0, action, true); - return 0; + return true; case SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW: /*@@ -1350,7 +1351,7 @@ static int __seccomp_filter(int this_sys * this action since SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW is the starting * state in seccomp_run_filters(). */ - return 0; + return true; case SECCOMP_RET_KILL_THREAD: case SECCOMP_RET_KILL_PROCESS:@@ -1367,46 +1368,46 @@ static int __seccomp_filter(int this_sys } else { do_exit(SIGSYS); } - return -1; /* skip the syscall go directly to signal handling */ + return false; /* skip the syscall go directly to signal handling */ } unreachable(); skip: seccomp_log(this_syscall, 0, action, match ? match->log : false); - return -1; + return false; } #else -static int __seccomp_filter(int this_syscall, const bool recheck_after_trace) +static bool __seccomp_filter(int this_syscall, const bool recheck_after_trace) { BUG(); - return -1; + return false; } #endif -int __secure_computing(void) +bool __seccomp_permit_syscall(void) { int mode = current->seccomp.mode; int this_syscall; if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE) && unlikely(current->ptrace & PT_SUSPEND_SECCOMP)) - return 0; + return true; this_syscall = syscall_get_nr(current, current_pt_regs()); switch (mode) { case SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT: __secure_computing_strict(this_syscall); /* may call do_exit */ - return 0; + return true; case SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER: return __seccomp_filter(this_syscall, false); /* Surviving SECCOMP_RET_KILL_* must be proactively impossible. */ case SECCOMP_MODE_DEAD: WARN_ON_ONCE(1); do_exit(SIGKILL); - return -1; + return false; default: BUG(); }