Thread (98 messages) 98 messages, 14 authors, 5h ago

Re: [patch 11/18] seccomp, treewide: Rename and convert __secure_computing() to return boolean

From: Jinjie Ruan <hidden>
Date: 2026-07-08 01:43:59
Also in: linux-alpha, linux-arch, linux-doc, linux-m68k, linux-mips, linux-riscv, linux-s390, linux-sh, linux-um, lkml, loongarch, sparclinux


On 7/8/2026 3:06 AM, Thomas Gleixner wrote:
From: Jinjie Ruan <redacted>

The return value of __secure_computing() currently uses 0 to indicate
that a system call should be allowed, and -1 to indicate that it should
be blocked/killed. This 0/-1 pattern is non-intuitive for a security
check function and makes the control flow at the call sites less readable.

Furthermore, any potential future changes to these return values would
require a high-risk, error-prone audit of all its users across different
architectures.

Sanitize this logic by converting the return type of __secure_computing()
to a proper boolean, where 'true' explicitly means 'allow' and 'false'
means 'fail/deny'.

Update all the two dozen or so call sites across the tree to align with
this new boolean semantic. No functional changes are intended, as the
callers still return -1 to the lower-level assembly entry code upon
seccomp denial.

Rename the function to __seccomp_permit_syscall() so that the purpose is
entirely clear.

[ tglx: Rename the function ]

Suggested-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@kernel.org>
Suggested-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jinjie Ruan <redacted>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@kernel.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Cc: Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Guo Ren <guoren@kernel.org>
Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@alpha.franken.de>
Cc: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Cc: Yoshinori Sato <ysato@users.sourceforge.jp>
Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Cc: Chris Zankel <chris@zankel.net>
Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Cc: linux-alpha@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-csky@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-m68k@lists.linux-m68k.org
Cc: linux-mips@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-sh@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-um@lists.infradead.org
---
 arch/alpha/kernel/ptrace.c            |    2 -
 arch/arm/kernel/ptrace.c              |    2 -
 arch/arm64/kernel/ptrace.c            |    2 -
 arch/csky/kernel/ptrace.c             |    2 -
 arch/m68k/kernel/ptrace.c             |    2 -
 arch/mips/kernel/ptrace.c             |    2 -
 arch/parisc/kernel/ptrace.c           |    2 -
 arch/sh/kernel/ptrace_32.c            |    2 -
 arch/um/kernel/skas/syscall.c         |    2 -
 arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c |   14 ++++++-------
 arch/xtensa/kernel/ptrace.c           |    3 --
 include/linux/entry-common.h          |    9 +++-----
 include/linux/seccomp.h               |   12 +++++------
 kernel/seccomp.c                      |   35 +++++++++++++++++-----------------
 14 files changed, 45 insertions(+), 46 deletions(-)
As Ada pointed out, the description of secure_computing in arch/Kconfig
need to be updated, a possible suggestion:
--- a/arch/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/Kconfig
@@ -636,8 +636,8 @@ config HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER
          - syscall_rollback()
          - syscall_set_return_value()
          - SIGSYS siginfo_t support
-         - secure_computing is called from a ptrace_event()-safe context
-         - secure_computing return value is checked and a return value
of -1
+         - seccomp_permits_syscall is called from a ptrace_event()-safe
context
+         - seccomp_permits_syscall return value is checked and if false


Link:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/b8f3b5cd-8d8a-4396-ba0c-011a83234dd9@arm.com/ (local)
quoted hunk ↗ jump to hunk
--- a/arch/alpha/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/arch/alpha/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -387,7 +387,7 @@ asmlinkage unsigned long syscall_trace_e
 	 * If this fails, seccomp may already have set up the return value
 	 * (e.g. SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO / TRACE).
 	 */
-	if (secure_computing() == -1) {
+	if (!seccomp_permit_syscall()) {
 		if (regs->r19 == 0 && regs->r0 == (unsigned long)-1)
 			syscall_set_return_value(current, regs, -ENOSYS, 0);
 		syscall_set_nr(current, regs, -1);
[...]
quoted hunk ↗ jump to hunk
-static int __seccomp_filter(int this_syscall, const bool recheck_after_trace)
+static bool __seccomp_filter(int this_syscall, const bool recheck_after_trace)
 {
 	u32 filter_ret, action;
 	struct seccomp_data sd;
@@ -1294,7 +1295,7 @@ static int __seccomp_filter(int this_sys
 	case SECCOMP_RET_TRACE:
 		/* We've been put in this state by the ptracer already. */
 		if (recheck_after_trace)
-			return 0;
+			return true;
 
 		/* ENOSYS these calls if there is no tracer attached. */
 		if (!ptrace_event_enabled(current, PTRACE_EVENT_SECCOMP)) {
@@ -1330,19 +1331,19 @@ static int __seccomp_filter(int this_sys
 		 * a skip would have already been reported.
 		 */
 		if (__seccomp_filter(this_syscall, true))
-			return -1;
+			return false;
The return value of __seccomp_filter is checked in the wrong way, check
-1 should be replaced with check false, maybe:

-               if (__seccomp_filter(this_syscall, true))
-                       return -1;
+               if (!__seccomp_filter(this_syscall, true))
+                       return false;

otherwise,

LGTM
Reviewed-by: Jinjie Ruan <redacted>
quoted hunk ↗ jump to hunk
 
-		return 0;
+		return true;
 
 	case SECCOMP_RET_USER_NOTIF:
 		if (seccomp_do_user_notification(this_syscall, match, &sd))
 			goto skip;
 
-		return 0;
+		return true;
 
 	case SECCOMP_RET_LOG:
 		seccomp_log(this_syscall, 0, action, true);
-		return 0;
+		return true;
 
 	case SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW:
 		/*
@@ -1350,7 +1351,7 @@ static int __seccomp_filter(int this_sys
 		 * this action since SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW is the starting
 		 * state in seccomp_run_filters().
 		 */
-		return 0;
+		return true;
 
 	case SECCOMP_RET_KILL_THREAD:
 	case SECCOMP_RET_KILL_PROCESS:
@@ -1367,46 +1368,46 @@ static int __seccomp_filter(int this_sys
 		} else {
 			do_exit(SIGSYS);
 		}
-		return -1; /* skip the syscall go directly to signal handling */
+		return false; /* skip the syscall go directly to signal handling */
 	}
 
 	unreachable();
 
 skip:
 	seccomp_log(this_syscall, 0, action, match ? match->log : false);
-	return -1;
+	return false;
 }
 #else
-static int __seccomp_filter(int this_syscall, const bool recheck_after_trace)
+static bool __seccomp_filter(int this_syscall, const bool recheck_after_trace)
 {
 	BUG();
 
-	return -1;
+	return false;
 }
 #endif
 
-int __secure_computing(void)
+bool __seccomp_permit_syscall(void)
 {
 	int mode = current->seccomp.mode;
 	int this_syscall;
 
 	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE) &&
 	    unlikely(current->ptrace & PT_SUSPEND_SECCOMP))
-		return 0;
+		return true;
 
 	this_syscall = syscall_get_nr(current, current_pt_regs());
 
 	switch (mode) {
 	case SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT:
 		__secure_computing_strict(this_syscall);  /* may call do_exit */
-		return 0;
+		return true;
 	case SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER:
 		return __seccomp_filter(this_syscall, false);
 	/* Surviving SECCOMP_RET_KILL_* must be proactively impossible. */
 	case SECCOMP_MODE_DEAD:
 		WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
 		do_exit(SIGKILL);
-		return -1;
+		return false;
 	default:
 		BUG();
 	}
  
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