On 7/8/2026 3:06 AM, Thomas Gleixner wrote:
From: Jinjie Ruan <redacted>
The return value of __secure_computing() currently uses 0 to indicate
that a system call should be allowed, and -1 to indicate that it should
be blocked/killed. This 0/-1 pattern is non-intuitive for a security
check function and makes the control flow at the call sites less readable.
Furthermore, any potential future changes to these return values would
require a high-risk, error-prone audit of all its users across different
architectures.
Sanitize this logic by converting the return type of __secure_computing()
to a proper boolean, where 'true' explicitly means 'allow' and 'false'
means 'fail/deny'.
Update all the two dozen or so call sites across the tree to align with
this new boolean semantic. No functional changes are intended, as the
callers still return -1 to the lower-level assembly entry code upon
seccomp denial.
Rename the function to __seccomp_permit_syscall() so that the purpose is
entirely clear.
[ tglx: Rename the function ]
Suggested-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@kernel.org>
Suggested-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jinjie Ruan <redacted>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@kernel.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Cc: Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Guo Ren <guoren@kernel.org>
Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@alpha.franken.de>
Cc: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Cc: Yoshinori Sato <ysato@users.sourceforge.jp>
Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Cc: Chris Zankel <chris@zankel.net>
Cc: <redacted>
Cc: <redacted>
Cc: <redacted>
Cc: <redacted>
Cc: <redacted>
Cc: <redacted>
Cc: <redacted>
Cc: <redacted>
---
arch/alpha/kernel/ptrace.c | 2 -
arch/arm/kernel/ptrace.c | 2 -
arch/arm64/kernel/ptrace.c | 2 -
arch/csky/kernel/ptrace.c | 2 -
arch/m68k/kernel/ptrace.c | 2 -
arch/mips/kernel/ptrace.c | 2 -
arch/parisc/kernel/ptrace.c | 2 -
arch/sh/kernel/ptrace_32.c | 2 -
arch/um/kernel/skas/syscall.c | 2 -
arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c | 14 ++++++-------
arch/xtensa/kernel/ptrace.c | 3 --
include/linux/entry-common.h | 9 +++-----
include/linux/seccomp.h | 12 +++++------
kernel/seccomp.c | 35 +++++++++++++++++-----------------
14 files changed, 45 insertions(+), 46 deletions(-)
As Ada pointed out, the description of secure_computing in arch/Kconfig
need to be updated, a possible suggestion:
--- a/arch/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/Kconfig
@@ -636,8 +636,8 @@ config HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER
- syscall_rollback()
- syscall_set_return_value()
- SIGSYS siginfo_t support
- - secure_computing is called from a ptrace_event()-safe context
- - secure_computing return value is checked and a return valueof -1
+ - seccomp_permits_syscall is called from a ptrace_event()-safe
context
+ - seccomp_permits_syscall return value is checked and if false
Link:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/b8f3b5cd-8d8a-4396-ba0c-011a83234dd9@arm.com/ (local)
quoted hunk ↗ jump to hunk
--- a/arch/alpha/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/arch/alpha/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -387,7 +387,7 @@ asmlinkage unsigned long syscall_trace_e
* If this fails, seccomp may already have set up the return value
* (e.g. SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO / TRACE).
*/
- if (secure_computing() == -1) {
+ if (!seccomp_permit_syscall()) {
if (regs->r19 == 0 && regs->r0 == (unsigned long)-1)
syscall_set_return_value(current, regs, -ENOSYS, 0);
syscall_set_nr(current, regs, -1);
[...]
quoted hunk ↗ jump to hunk
-static int __seccomp_filter(int this_syscall, const bool recheck_after_trace)
+static bool __seccomp_filter(int this_syscall, const bool recheck_after_trace)
{
u32 filter_ret, action;
struct seccomp_data sd;@@ -1294,7 +1295,7 @@ static int __seccomp_filter(int this_sys
case SECCOMP_RET_TRACE:
/* We've been put in this state by the ptracer already. */
if (recheck_after_trace)
- return 0;
+ return true;
/* ENOSYS these calls if there is no tracer attached. */
if (!ptrace_event_enabled(current, PTRACE_EVENT_SECCOMP)) {@@ -1330,19 +1331,19 @@ static int __seccomp_filter(int this_sys
* a skip would have already been reported.
*/
if (__seccomp_filter(this_syscall, true))
- return -1;
+ return false;
The return value of __seccomp_filter is checked in the wrong way, check
-1 should be replaced with check false, maybe:
- if (__seccomp_filter(this_syscall, true))
- return -1;
+ if (!__seccomp_filter(this_syscall, true))
+ return false;
otherwise,
LGTM
Reviewed-by: Jinjie Ruan <redacted>
quoted hunk ↗ jump to hunk
- return 0;
+ return true;
case SECCOMP_RET_USER_NOTIF:
if (seccomp_do_user_notification(this_syscall, match, &sd))
goto skip;
- return 0;
+ return true;
case SECCOMP_RET_LOG:
seccomp_log(this_syscall, 0, action, true);
- return 0;
+ return true;
case SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW:
/*
@@ -1350,7 +1351,7 @@ static int __seccomp_filter(int this_sys
* this action since SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW is the starting
* state in seccomp_run_filters().
*/
- return 0;
+ return true;
case SECCOMP_RET_KILL_THREAD:
case SECCOMP_RET_KILL_PROCESS:
@@ -1367,46 +1368,46 @@ static int __seccomp_filter(int this_sys
} else {
do_exit(SIGSYS);
}
- return -1; /* skip the syscall go directly to signal handling */
+ return false; /* skip the syscall go directly to signal handling */
}
unreachable();
skip:
seccomp_log(this_syscall, 0, action, match ? match->log : false);
- return -1;
+ return false;
}
#else
-static int __seccomp_filter(int this_syscall, const bool recheck_after_trace)
+static bool __seccomp_filter(int this_syscall, const bool recheck_after_trace)
{
BUG();
- return -1;
+ return false;
}
#endif
-int __secure_computing(void)
+bool __seccomp_permit_syscall(void)
{
int mode = current->seccomp.mode;
int this_syscall;
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE) &&
unlikely(current->ptrace & PT_SUSPEND_SECCOMP))
- return 0;
+ return true;
this_syscall = syscall_get_nr(current, current_pt_regs());
switch (mode) {
case SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT:
__secure_computing_strict(this_syscall); /* may call do_exit */
- return 0;
+ return true;
case SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER:
return __seccomp_filter(this_syscall, false);
/* Surviving SECCOMP_RET_KILL_* must be proactively impossible. */
case SECCOMP_MODE_DEAD:
WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
do_exit(SIGKILL);
- return -1;
+ return false;
default:
BUG();
}