On Sat, Oct 24, 2020 at 08:47:28AM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
On Sat, Oct 24, 2020 at 4:34 AM Jarkko Sakkinen [off-list ref] wrote:
quoted
On Fri, Oct 23, 2020 at 07:19:05AM -0700, Dave Hansen wrote:
quoted
On 10/23/20 3:17 AM, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
quoted
On Tue, Oct 20, 2020 at 02:19:26PM -0700, Dave Hansen wrote:
quoted
On 10/2/20 9:50 PM, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
quoted
+ * Failure to explicitly request access to a restricted attribute will cause
+ * sgx_ioc_enclave_init() to fail. Currently, the only restricted attribute
+ * is access to the PROVISION_KEY.
Could we also justify why access is restricted, please? Maybe:
Access is restricted because PROVISION_KEY is burned uniquely
into each each processor, making it a perfect unique identifier
with privacy and fingerprinting implications.
Are there any other reasons for doing it this way?
AFAIK, if I interperet the SDM correctl, PROVISION_KEY and
PROVISION_SEALING_KEY also have random salt added, i.e. they change
every boot cycle.
There is "RAND = yes" on those keys in Table 40-64 of Intel SDM volume
3D :-)
Does that mean there are no privacy implications from access to the
provisioning keys? If that's true, why do we need a separate permission
framework for creating provisioning enclaves?
As I've understood it, the key material for those keys is not even
required in the current SGX architecture, it was used in the legacy EPID
scheme, but the attribute itself is useful.
Let's assume that we have some sort of quoting enclave Q, which guards a
public key pair, which signs quotes of other enclaves. Let's assume we
have an attestation server A, which will enable some capabilities [*],
if it receives a quote signed with that public key pair.
1. E gets the report key with EGETKEY.
2. E constructs REPORTDATA (37.16) and TARGETINFO (37.17) structures.
The former describes the enclaves contents and attributes and latter
the target, i.e. Q in this artitificial example.
3. E calls EREPORT to generate a structure called REPORT MAC'd with the
*targets* report key. It knows, which key to usue from REPORTDATA.
4. The runtime will then pass this to Q.
5. Q will check if ATTRIBUTE.PROVISION_KEY is set. If it is, Q will
know that the enclave is allowed to get attested. Then it will
sign the report with the guarded public key pair and send it to
the attestation server.
I think you have this a little bit off. AIUI E won't have
ATTRIBUTE.PROVISION_KEY set -- Q will. Q uses the provisioning key to
convince an Intel server that it's running on a genuine Intel CPU, and
the Intel server will return a signed certificate that Q can chain off
of to generate attestations for E.
Right, I was confused by that RAND column, until Jethro corrected me.
Actually, quoting enclave (QE) authorizes itself with a provisioning
certification enclave (PCE), which holds certificates and revocation
lists for provisioning secrets unique to a CPU. And the sequence that I
described happens between PCE and QE. It accepts requests from enclaves
with ATTRIBUTES.PROVISION key bits set to 1 according to:
https://software.intel.com/content/dam/develop/external/us/en/documents/intel-sgx-support-for-third-party-attestation-801017.pdf
The source code for the reference is available here:
https://github.com/intel/SGXDataCenterAttestationPrimitives
And binaries are here:
https://01.org/intel-softwareguard-extensions/downloads/intel-sgx-dcap-1.6-release
They are provided for the inevitable reason that, it is the way bind to
the hardware, i.e. proof that you are running on a genuine CPU.
The network part is that PCE and QE can certify to an application, if an
enclave running in a different computer is an enclave.
Dave, I would rephrase what you're saying a bit. The PROVISION_KEY
attribute allows enclaves to access keys that are unique to a
processor and unchangeable. Unlike other SGX keys, these keys are not
affected by OWNER_EPOCH changes and therefore cannot be reset.
/Jarkko