Re: [PATCH v39 15/24] x86/sgx: Add SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_PROVISION

From
Dave Hansen <hidden>
Date
2020-10-23 14:19:20
Also in
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Reply to
Jarkko Sakkinen, 2020-10-23
On 10/23/20 3:17 AM, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
On Tue, Oct 20, 2020 at 02:19:26PM -0700, Dave Hansen wrote:
quoted
On 10/2/20 9:50 PM, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
quoted
+ * Failure to explicitly request access to a restricted attribute will cause
+ * sgx_ioc_enclave_init() to fail.  Currently, the only restricted attribute
+ * is access to the PROVISION_KEY.
Could we also justify why access is restricted, please?  Maybe:

	Access is restricted because PROVISION_KEY is burned uniquely
	into each each processor, making it a perfect unique identifier
	with privacy and fingerprinting implications.

Are there any other reasons for doing it this way?
AFAIK, if I interperet the SDM correctl, PROVISION_KEY and
PROVISION_SEALING_KEY also have random salt added, i.e. they change
every boot cycle.

There is "RAND = yes" on those keys in Table 40-64 of Intel SDM volume
3D :-)
Does that mean there are no privacy implications from access to the
provisioning keys?  If that's true, why do we need a separate permission
framework for creating provisioning enclaves?
Thread (12 messages) 12 messages, 7 authors, last reply 2020-10-27
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