Re: [PATCH v39 15/24] x86/sgx: Add SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_PROVISION

From
Jarkko Sakkinen <kernel.org@kernel.org>
Date
2020-10-24 11:40:18
Also in
lkml
Reply to
Jethro Beekman, 2020-10-23
On Fri, Oct 23, 2020 at 04:23:55PM +0200, Jethro Beekman wrote:
On 2020-10-23 12:17, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
quoted
On Tue, Oct 20, 2020 at 02:19:26PM -0700, Dave Hansen wrote:
quoted
On 10/2/20 9:50 PM, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
quoted
+ * Failure to explicitly request access to a restricted attribute will cause
+ * sgx_ioc_enclave_init() to fail.  Currently, the only restricted attribute
+ * is access to the PROVISION_KEY.
Could we also justify why access is restricted, please?  Maybe:

	Access is restricted because PROVISION_KEY is burned uniquely
	into each each processor, making it a perfect unique identifier
	with privacy and fingerprinting implications.

Are there any other reasons for doing it this way?
AFAIK, if I interperet the SDM correctl, PROVISION_KEY and
PROVISION_SEALING_KEY also have random salt added, i.e. they change
every boot cycle.

There is "RAND = yes" on those keys in Table 40-64 of Intel SDM volume
3D :-)
This is nonsense. The whole point of sealing keys is that they don't
change every boot. If did they they'd have no value over enclave
memory. RAND means that the KEYID field from the KEYREQUEST is
included in the derivation (as noted in the source row of the table
you looked at).
I just looked that the column name is RAND, the row is called "Provision
key" and the cell has "Yes" in it.
--
Jethro Beekman | Fortanix
/Jarkko
Thread (12 messages) 12 messages, 7 authors, last reply 2020-10-27
Keyboard shortcuts
hback out one level
jnext message in thread / next series-diff position
kprevious message in thread / previous series-diff position
ldrill in
Escclose help / fold thread tree
?toggle this help