Thread (12 messages) flat view 12 messages, 7 authors, 2020-10-27

Re: [PATCH v39 15/24] x86/sgx: Add SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_PROVISION

From: Jarkko Sakkinen <hidden>
Date: 2020-10-23 10:17:51
Also in: lkml

On Tue, Oct 20, 2020 at 02:19:26PM -0700, Dave Hansen wrote:
On 10/2/20 9:50 PM, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
quoted
+ * Failure to explicitly request access to a restricted attribute will cause
+ * sgx_ioc_enclave_init() to fail.  Currently, the only restricted attribute
+ * is access to the PROVISION_KEY.
Could we also justify why access is restricted, please?  Maybe:

	Access is restricted because PROVISION_KEY is burned uniquely
	into each each processor, making it a perfect unique identifier
	with privacy and fingerprinting implications.

Are there any other reasons for doing it this way?
AFAIK, if I interperet the SDM correctl, PROVISION_KEY and
PROVISION_SEALING_KEY also have random salt added, i.e. they change
every boot cycle.

There is "RAND = yes" on those keys in Table 40-64 of Intel SDM volume
3D :-)

/Jarkko
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