On Feb 7, 2020, at 11:54 AM, Mimi Zohar [off-list ref] wrote:

On Fri, 2020-02-07 at 11:45 -0700, Eric Snowberg wrote:

quoted

quoted

On Feb 7, 2020, at 11:28 AM, Mimi Zohar [off-list ref] wrote:

On Fri, 2020-02-07 at 10:49 -0700, Eric Snowberg wrote:

quoted

quoted

On Feb 7, 2020, at 10:40 AM, Mimi Zohar [off-list ref] wrote:

quoted

$ insmod ./foo.ko
insmod: ERROR: could not insert module ./foo.ko: Permission denied

last entry from audit log:
type=INTEGRITY_DATA msg=audit(1581089373.076:83): pid=2874 uid=0
auid=0 ses=1 subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-
s0:c0.c1023 op=appraise_data cause=invalid-signature comm="insmod"
name="/root/keys/modules/foo.ko" dev="dm-0" ino=10918365
res=0^]UID="root" AUID=“root"

This is because modsig_verify() will be called from within
ima_appraise_measurement(), 
since try_modsig is true.  Then modsig_verify() will return
INTEGRITY_FAIL.

Why is it an "invalid signature"?  For that you need to look at the
kernel messages.  Most likely it can't find the public key on the .ima
keyring to verify the signature.

It is invalid because the module has not been ima signed. 

With the IMA policy rule "appraise func=MODULE_CHECK
appraise_type=imasig|modsig", IMA first tries to verify the IMA
signature stored as an xattr and on failure then attempts to verify
the appended signatures.

The audit message above indicates that there was a signature, but the
signature validation failed.

I do have  CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG enabled.  I believe the audit message above 
is coming from modsig_verify in security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c.

Right, and it's calling:

	rc = integrity_modsig_verify(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_IMA, modsig);

It's failing because it is trying to find the public key on the .ima
keyring.  Make sure that the public needed to validate the kernel
module is on the IMA keyring (eg. keyctl show %keyring:.ima).

I know that will validate the module properly, but that is not what I’m 
trying to solve here. I thought the point of adding “|modsig” to the
ima policy was to tell ima it can either validate against an ima keyring OR 
default back to the kernel keyring.  This is what happens with the compressed
module.  There isn’t anything in the ima keyring to validate the compressed
modules and it loads when I add “|modsig”.

The use case I’m trying to solve is when someone boots with ima_policy=secure_boot.
If their initramfs contains compressed modules with appended signatures the
system boots.  If they use the same ima policy with an initramfs that contains
uncompressed modules, it doesn't boot.  I thought the point of adding “|modsig”
was to help with the initramfs problem, since it is difficult to ima sign
things within it.