On Wed, Nov 29, 2017 at 4:44 PM, Kees Cook [off-list ref] wrote:

quoted

That mainly leaves the protocol ones we need to look out for, I suspect.

This is where a lot of the exposure really comes from. socket()
triggers a bunch of stuff, but doesn't have an obvious privilege
associated with it... while it already does the name templates, maybe
add request_module_socket() just to explicitly mark it?

.. and this is where I'd expect that maybe we'd need some hackery.

Even including some ad-hoc rules like "this module is actually
maintained", possibly even with some /sys interface to extend/reduce
that set.

But maybe it's not even that bad.

                Linus
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