Re: [PATCH Part2 v5 00/45] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) Hypervisor Support
From: "Andy Lutomirski" <luto@kernel.org>
Date: 2021-11-16 05:01:23
Also in:
kvm, linux-crypto, linux-mm, lkml
On Mon, Nov 15, 2021, at 10:41 AM, Marc Orr wrote:
On Mon, Nov 15, 2021 at 10:26 AM Sean Christopherson [off-list ref] wrote:quoted
On Mon, Nov 15, 2021, Dr. David Alan Gilbert wrote:quoted
* Sean Christopherson (seanjc@google.com) wrote:quoted
On Fri, Nov 12, 2021, Borislav Petkov wrote:quoted
On Fri, Nov 12, 2021 at 09:59:46AM -0800, Dave Hansen wrote:quoted
Or, is there some mechanism that prevent guest-private memory from being accessed in random host kernel code?Or random host userspace code...quoted
So I'm currently under the impression that random host->guest accesses should not happen if not previously agreed upon by both.Key word "should".quoted
Because, as explained on IRC, if host touches a private guest page, whatever the host does to that page, the next time the guest runs, it'll get a #VC where it will see that that page doesn't belong to it anymore and then, out of paranoia, it will simply terminate to protect itself. So cloud providers should have an interest to prevent such random stray accesses if they wanna have guests. :)Yes, but IMO inducing a fault in the guest because of _host_ bug is wrong.Would it necessarily have been a host bug? A guest telling the host a bad GPA to DMA into would trigger this wouldn't it?No, because as Andy pointed out, host userspace must already guard against a bad GPA, i.e. this is just a variant of the guest telling the host to DMA to a GPA that is completely bogus. The shared vs. private behavior just means that when host userspace is doing a GPA=>HVA lookup, it needs to incorporate the "shared" state of the GPA. If the host goes and DMAs into the completely wrong HVA=>PFN, then that is a host bug; that the bug happened to be exploited by a buggy/malicious guest doesn't change the fact that the host messed up."If the host goes and DMAs into the completely wrong HVA=>PFN, then that is a host bug; that the bug happened to be exploited by a buggy/malicious guest doesn't change the fact that the host messed up." ^^^ Again, I'm flabbergasted that you are arguing that it's OK for a guest to exploit a host bug to take down host-side processes or the host itself, either of which could bring down all other VMs on the machine. I'm going to repeat -- this is not OK! Period.
I don’t understand the point you’re trying to make. If the host _kernel_has a bug that allows a guest to trigger invalid host memory access, this is bad. We want to know about it and fix it, abcs the security folks want to minimize the chance that such a bug exists. If host _userspace_ such a bug, the kernel should not crash if it’s exploited.