Re: [PATCH Part2 v5 00/45] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) Hypervisor Support
From: Brijesh Singh <hidden>
Date: 2021-11-15 23:07:49
Also in:
kvm, linux-crypto, linux-mm, lkml
From: Brijesh Singh <hidden>
Date: 2021-11-15 23:07:49
Also in:
kvm, linux-crypto, linux-mm, lkml
On 11/15/21 12:44 PM, Sean Christopherson wrote:
On Mon, Nov 15, 2021, Brijesh Singh wrote:quoted
On 11/12/21 2:37 PM, Sean Christopherson wrote:quoted
This is the direction KVM TDX support is headed, though it's obviously still a WIP.Just curious, in this approach, how do you propose handling the host kexec/kdump? If a kexec/kdump occurs while the VM is still active, the new kernel will encounter the #PF (RMP violation) because some pages are still marked 'private' in the RMP table.There are two basic options: a) eagerly purge the RMP or b) lazily fixup the RMP on #PF. Either approach can be made to work. I'm not opposed to fixing up the RMP on #PF in the kexec/kdump case, I'm opposed to blindly updating the RMP on _all_ RMP #PFs, i.e. the kernel should modify the RMP if and only if it knows that doing so is correct. E.g. a naive lazy-fixup solution would be to track which pages have been sanitized and adjust the RMP on #PF to a page that hasn't yet been sanitized.
Yap, I think option #a will require the current kernel to iterate through the entire memory and make it shared before booting the kexec kernel. It may bring another ask to track the guest private/shared on the host to minimize the iterations. thanks