Re: [PATCH v8 5/9] seccomp: split mode set routines
From: Kees Cook <hidden>
Date: 2014-06-27 18:33:52
Also in:
linux-arch, linux-arm-kernel, linux-mips, lkml
On Wed, Jun 25, 2014 at 11:07 AM, Andy Lutomirski [off-list ref] wrote:
On Wed, Jun 25, 2014 at 11:00 AM, Kees Cook [off-list ref] wrote:quoted
On Wed, Jun 25, 2014 at 10:51 AM, Oleg Nesterov [off-list ref] wrote:quoted
On 06/25, Andy Lutomirski wrote:quoted
On Wed, Jun 25, 2014 at 10:32 AM, Oleg Nesterov [off-list ref] wrote:quoted
On 06/25, Andy Lutomirski wrote:quoted
Write the filter, then smp_mb (or maybe a weaker barrier is okay), then set the bit.Yes, exactly, this is what I meant. Plas rmb() in __secure_computing(). But I still can't understand the rest of your discussion about the ordering we need ;)Let me try again from scratch. Currently there are three relevant variables: TIF_SECCOMP, seccomp.mode, and seccomp.filter. __secure_computing needs seccomp.mode and seccomp.filter to be in sync, and it wants (but doesn't really need) TIF_SECCOMP to be in sync as well. My suggestion is to rearrange it a bit. Move mode into seccomp.filter (so that filter == NULL implies no seccomp) and don't checkThis would require that we reimplement mode 1 seccomp via mode 2 filters. Which isn't too hard, but may add complexity.quoted
quoted
TIF_SECCOMP in secure_computing. Then turning on seccomp is entirely atomic except for the fact that the seccomp hooks won't be called if filter != NULL but !TIF_SECCOMP. This removes all ordering requirements.Ah, got it, thanks. Perhaps I missed somehing, but to me this looks like unnecessary complication at first glance. We alredy have TIF_SECCOMP, we need it anyway, and we should only care about the case when this bit is actually set, so that we can race with the 1st call of __secure_computing(). Otherwise we are fine: we can miss the new filter anyway, ->mode can't be changed it is already nonzero.quoted
Alternatively, __secure_computing could still BUG_ON(!seccomp.filter). In that case, filter needs to be set before TIF_SECCOMP is set, but that's straightforward.Yep. And this is how seccomp_assign_mode() already works? It is called after we change ->filter chain, it changes ->mode before set(TIF_SECCOMP) just it lacks a barrier.Right, I think the best solution is to add the barrier. I was concerned that adding the read barrier in secure_computing would have a performance impact, though.I can't speak for ARM, but I think that all of the read barriers are essentially free on x86. (smp_mb is a very different story, but that shouldn't be needed here.)
It looks like SMP ARM issues dsb for rmb, which seems a bit expensive. http://infocenter.arm.com/help/index.jsp?topic=/com.arm.doc.dui0204g/CIHJFGFE.html If I skip the rmb in the secure_computing call before checking mode, it sounds like I run the risk of racing an out-of-order TIF_SECCOMP vs mode and filter. This seems unlikely to me, given an addition of the smp_mb__before_atomic() during the seccomp_assign_mode()? I guess I don't have a sense of how aggressively ARM might do data caching in this area. Could the other thread actually see TIF_SECCOMP get set but still have an out of date copy of seccomp.mode? I really want to avoid adding anything to the secure_computing() execution path. :( -Kees -- Kees Cook Chrome OS Security