Re: [PATCH v8 9/9] seccomp: implement SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC
From: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Date: 2014-06-25 16:53:57
Also in:
linux-arch, linux-arm-kernel, linux-mips, lkml
On 06/25, Kees Cook wrote:
On Wed, Jun 25, 2014 at 7:21 AM, Oleg Nesterov [off-list ref] wrote:quoted
But. Doesn't this change add a new security hole? Obviously, we should not allow to install a filter and then (say) exec a suid binary, that is why we have no_new_privs/LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS. But what if "thread->seccomp.filter = caller->seccomp.filter" races with any user of task_no_new_privs() ? Say, suppose this thread has already passed check_unsafe_exec/etc and it is going to exec the suid binary?Oh, ew. Yeah. It looks like there's a cred lock to be held to combat this?
Yes, cred_guard_mutex looks like an obvious choice... Hmm, but somehow initially I thought that the fix won't be simple. Not sure why. Yes, at least this should close the race with suid-exec. And there are no other users. Except apparmor, and I hope you will check it because I simply do not know what it does ;)
I wonder if changes to nnp need to "flushed" during syscall entry instead of getting updated externally/asynchronously? That way it won't be out of sync with the seccomp mode/filters. Perhaps secure computing needs to check some (maybe seccomp-only) atomic flags and flip on the "real" nnp if found?
Not sure I understand you, could you clarify? But I was also worried that task_no_new_privs(current) is no longer stable inside the syscall paths, perhaps this is what you meant? However I do not see something bad here... And this has nothing to do with the race above. Also. Even ignoring no_new_privs, SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC is not atomic and we can do nothing with this fact (unless it try to freeze the thread group somehow), perhaps it makes sense to document this somehow. I mean, suppose you want to ensure write-to-file is not possible, so you do seccomp(SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC, nack_write_to_file_filter). You can't assume that this has effect right after seccomp() returns, this can obviously race with a sub-thread which has already entered sys_write(). Once again, I am not arguing, just I think it makes sense to at least mention the limitations during the discussion. Oleg.