On 06/25, Kees Cook wrote:

On Wed, Jun 25, 2014 at 9:52 AM, Oleg Nesterov [off-list ref] wrote:

quoted

Yes, at least this should close the race with suid-exec. And there are no
other users. Except apparmor, and I hope you will check it because I simply
do not know what it does ;)

quoted

I wonder if changes to nnp need to "flushed" during syscall entry
instead of getting updated externally/asynchronously? That way it
won't be out of sync with the seccomp mode/filters.

Perhaps secure computing needs to check some (maybe seccomp-only)
atomic flags and flip on the "real" nnp if found?

Not sure I understand you, could you clarify?

Instead of having TSYNC change the nnp bit, it can set a new flag, say:

    task->seccomp.flags |= SECCOMP_NEEDS_NNP;

This would be set along with seccomp.mode, seccomp.filter, and
TIF_SECCOMP. Then, during the next secure_computing() call that thread
makes, it would check the flag:

    if (task->seccomp.flags & SECCOMP_NEEDS_NNP)
        task->nnp = 1;

This means that nnp couldn't change in the middle of a running syscall.

Aha, so you were worried about the same thing. Not sure we need this,
but at least I understand you and...

Hmmm. Perhaps this doesn't solve anything, though? Perhaps my proposal
above would actually make things worse, since now we'd have a thread
with seccomp set up, and no nnp. If it was in the middle of exec,
we're still causing a problem.

Yes ;)

I think we'd also need a way to either delay the seccomp changes, or
to notice this condition during exec. Bleh.

Hmm. confused again,

What actually happens with a multi-threaded process calls exec? I
assume all the other threads are destroyed?

Yes. But this is the point-of-no-return, de_thread() is called after the execing
thared has already passed (say) check_unsafe_exec().

However, do_execve() takes cred_guard_mutex at the start in prepare_bprm_creds()
and drops it in install_exec_creds(), so it should solve the problem?

Oleg.