[PATCH v10 2/6] object-file.c: do fsync() and close() before post-write die()

Change write_loose_object() to do an fsync() and close() before the
oideq() sanity check at the end. This change re-joins code that was
split up by the die() sanity check added in 748af44c63e (sha1_file: be
paranoid when creating loose objects, 2010-02-21).

I don't think that this change matters in itself, if we called die()
it was possible that our data wouldn't fully make it to disk, but in
any case we were writing data that we'd consider corrupted. It's
possible that a subsequent "git fsck" will be less confused now.

The real reason to make this change is that in a subsequent commit
we'll split this code in write_loose_object() into a utility function,
all its callers will want the preceding sanity checks, but not the
"oideq" check. By moving the close_loose_object() earlier it'll be
easier to reason about the introduction of the utility function.

Signed-off-by: Ævar Arnfjörð Bjarmason <redacted>
---
 object-file.c | 13 +++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/object-file.c b/object-file.c
index 5c9525479c2..edebdc91221 100644
--- a/object-file.c
+++ b/object-file.c

@@ -2001,12 +2001,21 @@ static int write_loose_object(const struct object_id *oid, char *hdr,
 		die(_("deflateEnd on object %s failed (%d)"), oid_to_hex(oid),
 		    ret);
 	the_hash_algo->final_oid_fn(&parano_oid, &c);
+
+	/*
+	 * We already did a write_buffer() to the "fd", let's fsync()
+	 * and close().
+	 *
+	 * We might still die() on a subsequent sanity check, but
+	 * let's not add to that confusion by not flushing any
+	 * outstanding writes to disk first.
+	 */
+	close_loose_object(fd);
+
 	if (!oideq(oid, &parano_oid))
 		die(_("confused by unstable object source data for %s"),
 		    oid_to_hex(oid));
 
-	close_loose_object(fd);
-
 	if (mtime) {
 		struct utimbuf utb;
 		utb.actime = mtime;

-- 
2.35.1.940.ge7a5b4b05f2