Re: [PATCH net] virtio-net: suppress bad irq warning for tx napi
From: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>
Date: 2021-09-29 21:53:48
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virtualization
On Wed, Sep 29, 2021 at 01:21:58PM -0700, Wei Wang wrote:
quoted hunk ↗ jump to hunk
On Mon, Apr 12, 2021 at 10:16 PM Michael S. Tsirkin [off-list ref] wrote:quoted
On Fri, Feb 05, 2021 at 02:28:33PM -0800, Wei Wang wrote:quoted
On Thu, Feb 4, 2021 at 12:48 PM Willem de Bruijn [off-list ref] wrote:quoted
On Wed, Feb 3, 2021 at 6:53 PM Wei Wang [off-list ref] wrote:quoted
On Wed, Feb 3, 2021 at 3:10 PM Michael S. Tsirkin [off-list ref] wrote:quoted
On Wed, Feb 03, 2021 at 01:24:08PM -0500, Willem de Bruijn wrote:quoted
On Wed, Feb 3, 2021 at 5:42 AM Michael S. Tsirkin [off-list ref] wrote:quoted
On Tue, Feb 02, 2021 at 07:06:53PM -0500, Willem de Bruijn wrote:quoted
On Tue, Feb 2, 2021 at 6:53 PM Willem de Bruijn [off-list ref] wrote:quoted
On Tue, Feb 2, 2021 at 6:47 PM Wei Wang [off-list ref] wrote:quoted
On Tue, Feb 2, 2021 at 3:12 PM Michael S. Tsirkin [off-list ref] wrote:quoted
On Thu, Jan 28, 2021 at 04:21:36PM -0800, Wei Wang wrote:quoted
With the implementation of napi-tx in virtio driver, we clean tx descriptors from rx napi handler, for the purpose of reducing tx complete interrupts. But this could introduce a race where tx complete interrupt has been raised, but the handler found there is no work to do because we have done the work in the previous rx interrupt handler. This could lead to the following warning msg: [ 3588.010778] irq 38: nobody cared (try booting with the "irqpoll" option) [ 3588.017938] CPU: 4 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/4 Not tainted 5.3.0-19-generic #20~18.04.2-Ubuntu [ 3588.017940] Call Trace: [ 3588.017942] <IRQ> [ 3588.017951] dump_stack+0x63/0x85 [ 3588.017953] __report_bad_irq+0x35/0xc0 [ 3588.017955] note_interrupt+0x24b/0x2a0 [ 3588.017956] handle_irq_event_percpu+0x54/0x80 [ 3588.017957] handle_irq_event+0x3b/0x60 [ 3588.017958] handle_edge_irq+0x83/0x1a0 [ 3588.017961] handle_irq+0x20/0x30 [ 3588.017964] do_IRQ+0x50/0xe0 [ 3588.017966] common_interrupt+0xf/0xf [ 3588.017966] </IRQ> [ 3588.017989] handlers: [ 3588.020374] [<000000001b9f1da8>] vring_interrupt [ 3588.025099] Disabling IRQ #38 This patch adds a new param to struct vring_virtqueue, and we set it for tx virtqueues if napi-tx is enabled, to suppress the warning in such case. Fixes: 7b0411ef4aa6 ("virtio-net: clean tx descriptors from rx napi") Reported-by: Rick Jones <redacted> Signed-off-by: Wei Wang <redacted> Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>This description does not make sense to me. irq X: nobody cared only triggers after an interrupt is unhandled repeatedly. So something causes a storm of useless tx interrupts here. Let's find out what it was please. What you are doing is just preventing linux from complaining.The traffic that causes this warning is a netperf tcp_stream with at least 128 flows between 2 hosts. And the warning gets triggered on the receiving host, which has a lot of rx interrupts firing on all queues, and a few tx interrupts. And I think the scenario is: when the tx interrupt gets fired, it gets coalesced with the rx interrupt. Basically, the rx and tx interrupts get triggered very close to each other, and gets handled in one round of do_IRQ(). And the rx irq handler gets called first, which calls virtnet_poll(). However, virtnet_poll() calls virtnet_poll_cleantx() to try to do the work on the corresponding tx queue as well. That's why when tx interrupt handler gets called, it sees no work to do. And the reason for the rx handler to handle the tx work is here: https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/virtualization/2017-April/034740.htmlIndeed. It's not a storm necessarily. The warning occurs after one hundred such events, since boot, which is a small number compared real interrupt load.Sorry, this is wrong. It is the other call to __report_bad_irq from note_interrupt that applies here.quoted
Occasionally seeing an interrupt with no work is expected after 7b0411ef4aa6 ("virtio-net: clean tx descriptors from rx napi"). As long as this rate of events is very low compared to useful interrupts, and total interrupt count is greatly reduced vs not having work stealing, it is a net win.Right, but if 99900 out of 100000 interrupts were wasted, then it is surely an even greater win to disable interrupts while polling like this. Might be tricky to detect, disabling/enabling aggressively every time even if there's nothing in the queue is sure to cause lots of cache line bounces, and we don't want to enable callbacks if they were not enabled e.g. by start_xmit ... Some kind of counter?Yes. It was known that the work stealing is more effective in some workloads than others. But a 99% spurious rate I had not anticipated. Most interesting is the number of interrupts suppressed as a result of the feature. That is not captured by this statistic. In any case, we'll take a step back to better understand behavior. And especially why this high spurious rate exhibits in this workload with many concurrent flows.I've been thinking about it. Imagine work stealing working perfectly. Each time we xmit a packet, it is stolen and freed. Since xmit enables callbacks (just in case!) we also get an interrupt, which is automatically spurious. My conclusion is that we shouldn't just work around it but instead (or additionally?) reduce the number of interrupts by disabling callbacks e.g. when a. we are currently stealing packets or b. we stole all packetsAgreed. This might prove a significant performance gain at the same time :)quoted
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Thinking along this line, that probably means, we should disable cb on the tx virtqueue, when scheduling the napi work on the rx side, and reenable it after the rx napi work is done? Also, I wonder if it is too late to disable cb at the point we start to steal pkts or have stolen all pkts.The earlier the better. I see no benefit to delay until the rx handler actually runs.I've been thinking more on this. I think the fundamental issue here is that the rx napi handler virtnet_poll() does the tx side work by calling virtnet_poll_cleantx() without any notification to the tx side. I am thinking, in virtnet_poll(), instead of directly call virtnet_poll_cleantx(), why not do virtqueue_napi_schedule() to schedule the tx side napi, and let the tx napi handler do the cleaning work. This way, we automatically call virtqueue_disable_cb() on the tx vq, and after the tx work is done, virtqueue_napi_complete() is called to re-enable the cb on the tx side. This way, the tx side knows what has been done, and will likely reduce the # of spurious tx interrupts? And I don't think there is much cost in doing that, since napi_schedule() basically queues the tx napi to the back of its napi_list, and serves it right after the rx napi handler is done. What do you guys think? I could quickly test it up to see if it solves the issue.Sure pls test. I think you will want to disable event index for now to make sure disable cb is not a nop (I am working on fixing that).Hi Michael and Jason, I'd like to follow up on this issue a bit more. I've done some more investigation into this issue: 1. With Michael's recent patch: a7766ef18b336 ("virtio_net: disable cb aggressively"), we are still seeing this issue with a tcp_stream test with 240 flows. 2. We've tried with the following patch to suppress cleaning tx queue from rx napi handler for 10% of the time:diff --git a/drivers/net/virtio_net.c b/drivers/net/virtio_net.c index 79bd2585ec6b..711768dbc617 100644 --- a/drivers/net/virtio_net.c +++ b/drivers/net/virtio_net.c@@ -1510,6 +1510,8 @@ static void virtnet_poll_cleantx(struct receive_queue *rq) return; if (__netif_tx_trylock(txq)) { + if (virtqueue_more_used(sq->vq) && !prandom_u32_max(10)) + goto unlock; do { virtqueue_disable_cb(sq->vq); free_old_xmit_skbs(sq, true);@@ -1518,6 +1520,7 @@ static void virtnet_poll_cleantx(struct receive_queue *rq) if (sq->vq->num_free >= 2 + MAX_SKB_FRAGS) netif_tx_wake_queue(txq); +unlock: __netif_tx_unlock(txq); } }This also does not help. It turns out skipping 10% is just not enough. We have to skip for 50% of the time in order for the warning to be suppressed. And this does not seem to be a viable solution since how much we skip probably will depend on the traffic pattern. My questions here: 1. Michael mentioned that if we use split queues with event idx, the interrupts are not actually being disabled. Is this still the case? If so, is that also the cause for so many spurious interrupts? 2. Michael also submitted another patch: 8d622d21d248 ("virtio: fix up virtio_disable_cb"). I am not quite sure, would that change help reduce the # of spurious interrupts we see if we use split queues with event idx? From my limited understanding, that patch skips calling virtqueue_disable_cb_split() if event_trigger is set for split queues. BTW, I have the setup to reproduce this issue easily. So do let me know if you have other ideas on how to fix it. Thanks. Wei
I think that commit is needed to fix the issue, yes. My suggestion is to try v5.14 in its entirety rather than cherry-picking. If you see that the issue is fixed there I can point you to a list of commit to backport.
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Because the steal work is done in the napi handler of the rx queue. But the tx interrupt must have been raised before that. Will we come back to process the tx interrupt again after we re-enabled the cb on the tx side?quoted
This should be enough to reduce the chances below 99% ;) One annoying thing is that with split and event index, we do not disable interrupts. Could be worth revisiting, for now maybe just disable the event index feature? I am not sure it is actually worth it with stealing.With event index, we suppress interrupts when another interrupt is already pending from a previous packet, right? When the previous position of the producer is already beyond the consumer. It doesn't matter whether the previous packet triggered a tx interrupt or deferred to an already scheduled rx interrupt? From that seems fine to leave it out.