On Thu, Feb 20, 2020 at 10:33:36AM -0800, Jordan Hand wrote:
On 2/20/20 10:13 AM, Sean Christopherson wrote:
quoted
There are essentially two paths we can take:
1) Exempt EPC pages from RIE during mmap()/mprotect(), i.e. don't add
PROT_EXEC for enclaves.
2) Punt the issue to userspace.
Option (1) is desirable in some ways:
- Enclaves will get an executable stack if and only if the loader/creator
intentionally configures it to have an executable stack.
- Separates enclaves from the personality of the loader.
- Userspace doesn't have to do anything for the common case of not
wanting an executable stack for its enclaves.
The big down side to (1) is that it'd require an ugly hook in architecture
agnostic code. And arguably, it reduces the overall security of the
platform (more below).
For (2), userspace has a few options:
a) Tell the linker the enclave loader doesn't need RIE, either via a .note
in assembly files or via the global "-z noexecstack" flag.
b) Spawn a separate process to run/map the enclave if the enclave loader
needs RIE.
c) Require enclaves to allow PROT_EXEC on all pages. Note, this is an
absolutely terrible idea and only included for completeness.
As shown by the lack of a mmap()/mprotect() hook in this series to squash
RIE, we chose option (2). Given that enclave loaders are not legacy code
and hopefully following decent coding practices, option (2a) should suffice
for all loaders. The security benefit mentioned above is that forcing
enclave loaders to squash RIE eliminates an exectuable stack as an attack
vector on the loader.
I see your point and I do agree that there are security benefits to (2a)
and I think we could do that for our loader. That said, it does concern
me that this breaks perfectly valid userspace behavior. If a userspace
process decides to use RIE, I don't know that the SGX driver should
disobey that decision.
So option (3) would be to just honor RIE for enclave pages and when page
permissions are set to PROT_READ in sgx_encl_page_alloc and RIE is set,
also add PROT_EXEC.
Ah, right, IIRC that idea also came up in our internal discussions. Note,
SGX would need to implement this option by checking for RIE in
sgx_encl_may_map(), as the process that built the enclave may not be the
same process that is running the enclave.
I understand your concerns that this using RIE is bad security practice
and I'm not convinced that (3) is the way to go, but from a philosophy
perspective I don't know that the kernel should be in the business of
stopping userspace from doing valid things.
If option (3) can't/shouldn't be done for some reason, option (1) at
least keeps from breaking expected userspace behavior. But I do agree
that (1) is ugly to implement.
My biggest concern for allowing PROT_EXEC if RIE is that it would result
in #PF(SGX) (#GP on Skylake) due to an EPCM violation if the enclave
actually tried to execute from such a page. This isn't a problem for the
kernel as the fault will be reported cleanly through the vDSO (or get
delivered as a SIGSEGV if the enclave isn't entered through the vDSO), but
it's a bit weird for userspace as userspace will see the #PF(SGX) and
likely assume the EPC was lost, e.g. silently restart the enclave instead
of logging an error that the enclave is broken.