Re: [PATCH v26 10/22] x86/sgx: Linux Enclave Driver

From
Jordan Hand <hidden>
Date
2020-02-20 18:33:40
Also in
lkml
Reply to
Sean Christopherson, 2020-02-20
On 2/20/20 10:13 AM, Sean Christopherson wrote:
On Tue, Feb 18, 2020 at 07:26:31PM -0800, Jordan Hand wrote:
quoted
During mprotect (in mm/mprotect.c line 525) the following checks if
READ_IMPLIES_EXECUTE and a PROT_READ is being requested. If so and
VM_MAYEXEC is set, it also adds PROT_EXEC to the request.

	if (rier && (vma->vm_flags & VM_MAYEXEC))
		prot |= PROT_EXEC;

But if we look at sgx_encl_page_alloc(), we see vm_max_prot_bits is set
without taking VM_MAYEXEC into account:

	encl_page->vm_max_prot_bits = calc_vm_prot_bits(prot, 0);

sgx_encl_may_map() checks that the requested protection can be added with:

	if (!page || (~page->vm_max_prot_bits & vm_prot_bits))
		return -EACCESS

This means that for any process where READ_IMPLIES_EXECUTE is set and
page where (vma->vm_flags & VM_MAYEXEC) == true, mmap/mprotect calls to
that request PROT_READ on a page that was not added with PROT_EXEC will
fail.
I could've sworn this was discussed on the SGX list at one point, but
apparently we only discussed it internally.  Anyways...

More than likely, the READ_IMPLIES_EXECUTE (RIE) crud rears its head
because part of the enclave loader is written in assembly.  Unless
explicitly told otherwise, the linker assumes that any program with
assembly code may need an executable stack, which leads to the RIE
personality being set for the process.  Here's a fantastic write up for
more details: https://www.airs.com/blog/archives/518

There are essentially two paths we can take:

 1) Exempt EPC pages from RIE during mmap()/mprotect(), i.e. don't add
    PROT_EXEC for enclaves.

 2) Punt the issue to userspace.

Option (1) is desirable in some ways:

  - Enclaves will get an executable stack if and only if the loader/creator
    intentionally configures it to have an executable stack.

  - Separates enclaves from the personality of the loader.

  - Userspace doesn't have to do anything for the common case of not
    wanting an executable stack for its enclaves.

The big down side to (1) is that it'd require an ugly hook in architecture
agnostic code.  And arguably, it reduces the overall security of the
platform (more below).

For (2), userspace has a few options:

 a) Tell the linker the enclave loader doesn't need RIE, either via a .note
    in assembly files or via the global "-z noexecstack" flag.

 b) Spawn a separate process to run/map the enclave if the enclave loader
    needs RIE.

 c) Require enclaves to allow PROT_EXEC on all pages.  Note, this is an
    absolutely terrible idea and only included for completeness.

As shown by the lack of a mmap()/mprotect() hook in this series to squash
RIE, we chose option (2).  Given that enclave loaders are not legacy code
and hopefully following decent coding practices, option (2a) should suffice
for all loaders.  The security benefit mentioned above is that forcing
enclave loaders to squash RIE eliminates an exectuable stack as an attack
vector on the loader.
I see your point and I do agree that there are security benefits to (2a)
and I think we could do that for our loader. That said, it does concern
me that this breaks perfectly valid userspace behavior. If a userspace
process decides to use RIE, I don't know that the SGX driver should
disobey that decision.

So option (3) would be to just honor RIE for enclave pages and when page
permissions are set to PROT_READ in sgx_encl_page_alloc and RIE is set,
also add PROT_EXEC.

I understand your concerns that this using RIE is bad security practice
and I'm not convinced that (3) is the way to go, but from a philosophy
perspective I don't know that the kernel should be in the business of
stopping userspace from doing valid things.

If option (3) can't/shouldn't be done for some reason, option (1) at
least keeps from breaking expected userspace behavior. But I do agree
that (1) is ugly to implement.

-Jordan
Thread (24 messages) 24 messages, 7 authors, last reply 2020-02-21
Keyboard shortcuts
hback out one level
jnext message in thread / next series-diff position
kprevious message in thread / previous series-diff position
ldrill in
Escclose help / fold thread tree
?toggle this help