[PATCH 04/27] Restrict /dev/mem and /dev/kmem when the kernel is locked down
From: Ethan Zhao <hidden>
Date: 2017-10-24 10:48:52
Also in:
linux-efi, lkml
David?
May I ask a question here -- Is it intentionally enabling the
read-only mode, so userspace
tools like dmidecode could work with kernel_is_locked_down ? while it
was impossible to work
with the attached patch applied. Is it a security policy change with
secure boot ?
Thanks,
Ethan
On Mon, Oct 23, 2017 at 10:34 PM, David Howells [off-list ref] wrote:quoted hunk ↗ jump to hunk
I think I should replace this patch with the attached. This will prevent /dev/mem, /dev/kmem and /dev/port from being *opened*, and thereby preventing read, write and ioctl. David --- commit e68daa2256986932b9a7d6709cf9e24b30d93583 Author: Matthew Garrett [off-list ref] Date: Wed May 24 14:56:02 2017 +0100 Restrict /dev/{mem,kmem,port} when the kernel is locked down Allowing users to read and write to core kernel memory makes it possible for the kernel to be subverted, avoiding module loading restrictions, and also to steal cryptographic information. Disallow /dev/mem and /dev/kmem from being opened this when the kernel has been locked down to prevent this. Also disallow /dev/port from being opened to prevent raw ioport access and thus DMA from being used to accomplish the same thing. Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett [off-list ref] Signed-off-by: David Howells [off-list ref] Reviewed-by: "Lee, Chun-Yi" [off-list ref]diff --git a/drivers/char/mem.c b/drivers/char/mem.c index 593a8818aca9..0ce5ac0a5c6b 100644 --- a/drivers/char/mem.c +++ b/drivers/char/mem.c@@ -762,6 +762,8 @@ static loff_t memory_lseek(struct file *file, loff_t offset, int orig) static int open_port(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp) { + if (kernel_is_locked_down("/dev/mem,kmem,port")) + return -EPERM; return capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO) ? 0 : -EPERM; }
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