On Thu 2015-04-09 09:12:08, Mike Snitzer wrote:

On Mon, Apr 06 2015 at  9:29am -0400,
Pali Rohár [off-list ref] wrote:

quoted

On Monday 06 April 2015 15:00:46 Mike Snitzer wrote:

quoted

On Sun, Apr 05 2015 at  1:20pm -0400,

Pali Rohár [off-list ref] wrote:

quoted

This patch series increase security of suspend and hibernate
actions. It allows user to safely wipe crypto keys before
suspend and hibernate actions starts without race
conditions on userspace process with heavy I/O.

To automatically wipe cryto key for <device> before
hibernate action call: $ dmsetup message <device> 0 key
wipe_on_hibernation 1

To automatically wipe cryto key for <device> before suspend
action call: $ dmsetup message <device> 0 key
wipe_on_suspend 1

(Value 0 after wipe_* string reverts original behaviour - to
not wipe key)

Can you elaborate on the attack vector your changes are meant
to protect against?  The user already authorized access, why
is it inherently dangerous to _not_ wipe the associated key
across these events?

Hi,

yes, I will try to explain current problems with cryptsetup 
luksSuspend command and hibernation.

First, sometimes it is needed to put machine into other hands. 
You can still watch other person what is doing with machine, but 
once if you let machine unlocked (e.g opened luks disk), she/he 
can access encrypted data.

If you turn off machine, it could be safe, because luks disk 
devices are locked. But if you enter machine into suspend or 
hibernate state luks devices are still open. And my patches try 
to achieve similar security as when machine is off (= no crypto 
keys in RAM or on swap).

When doing hibernate on unencrypted swap it is to prevent leaking 
crypto keys to hibernate image (which is stored in swap).

When doing suspend action it is again to prevent leaking crypto 
keys. E.g when you suspend laptop and put it off (somebody can 
remove RAMs and do some cold boot attack).

The most common situation is:
You have mounted partition from dm-crypt device (e.g. /home/), 
some userspace processes access it (e.g opened firefox which 
still reads/writes to cache ~/.firefox/) and you want to drop 
crypto keys from kernel for some time.

For that operation there is command cryptsetup luksSuspend, which 
suspend dm device and then tell kernel to wipe crypto keys. All 
I/O operations are then stopped and userspace processes which 
want to do some those I/O operations are stopped too (until you 
call cryptsetup luksResume and enter correct key).

Now if you want to suspend/hiberate your machine (when some of dm 
devices are suspeneded and some processes are stopped due to 
pending I/O) it is not possible. Kernel freeze_processes function 
will fail because userspace processes are still stopped inside 
some I/O syscall (read/write, etc,...).

My patches fixes this problem and do those operations (suspend dm 
device, wipe crypto keys, enter suspend/hiberate) in correct 
order and without race condition.

dm device is suspended *after* userspace processes are freezed 
and after that are crypto keys wiped. And then computer/laptop 
enters into suspend/hibernate state.

Wouldn't it be better to fix freeze_processes() to be tolerant of
processes that are hung as a side-effect of their backing storage being
suspended?  A hibernate shouldn't fail simply because a user chose to
suspend a DM device.

That would be nice, I agree. But that's non-trivial ammount of work
and might be (close to) impossible.
									Pavel
-- 
(english) http://www.livejournal.com/~pavelmachek
(cesky, pictures) http://atrey.karlin.mff.cuni.cz/~pavel/picture/horses/blog.html