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[PATCH v29 02/32] x86/cet/shstk: Add Kconfig option for Shadow Stack

From: Yu-cheng Yu <hidden>
Date: 2021-08-20 18:18:48
Also in: linux-api, linux-arch, linux-mm, lkml
Subsystem: the rest, x86 architecture (32-bit and 64-bit) · Maintainers: Linus Torvalds, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, Borislav Petkov, Dave Hansen

Shadow Stack provides protection against function return address
corruption.  It is active when the processor supports it, the kernel has
CONFIG_X86_SHADOW_STACK enabled, and the application is built for the
feature.  This is only implemented for the 64-bit kernel.  When it is
enabled, legacy non-Shadow Stack applications continue to work, but without
protection.

Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <redacted>
Cc: Kees Cook <redacted>
---
v25:
- Remove X86_CET and use X86_SHADOW_STACK directly.

v24:
- Update for the splitting X86_CET to X86_SHADOW_STACK and X86_IBT.
---
 arch/x86/Kconfig           | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/Kconfig.assembler |  5 +++++
 2 files changed, 27 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index 88fb922c23a0..cb0405ccf858 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ config X86_64
 	depends on 64BIT
 	# Options that are inherently 64-bit kernel only:
 	select ARCH_HAS_GIGANTIC_PAGE
+	select ARCH_HAS_SHADOW_STACK
 	select ARCH_SUPPORTS_INT128 if CC_HAS_INT128
 	select ARCH_USE_CMPXCHG_LOCKREF
 	select HAVE_ARCH_SOFT_DIRTY
@@ -1908,6 +1909,27 @@ config X86_SGX
 
 	  If unsure, say N.
 
+config ARCH_HAS_SHADOW_STACK
+	def_bool n
+
+config X86_SHADOW_STACK
+	prompt "Intel Shadow Stack"
+	def_bool n
+	depends on AS_WRUSS
+	depends on ARCH_HAS_SHADOW_STACK
+	select ARCH_USES_HIGH_VMA_FLAGS
+	help
+	  Shadow Stack protection is a hardware feature that detects function
+	  return address corruption.  This helps mitigate ROP attacks.
+	  Applications must be enabled to use it, and old userspace does not
+	  get protection "for free".
+	  Support for this feature is present on Tiger Lake family of
+	  processors released in 2020 or later.  Enabling this feature
+	  increases kernel text size by 3.7 KB.
+	  See Documentation/x86/intel_cet.rst for more information.
+
+	  If unsure, say N.
+
 config EFI
 	bool "EFI runtime service support"
 	depends on ACPI
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig.assembler b/arch/x86/Kconfig.assembler
index 26b8c08e2fc4..00c79dd93651 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig.assembler
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig.assembler
@@ -19,3 +19,8 @@ config AS_TPAUSE
 	def_bool $(as-instr,tpause %ecx)
 	help
 	  Supported by binutils >= 2.31.1 and LLVM integrated assembler >= V7
+
+config AS_WRUSS
+	def_bool $(as-instr,wrussq %rax$(comma)(%rbx))
+	help
+	  Supported by binutils >= 2.31 and LLVM integrated assembler
-- 
2.21.0
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