[PATCH v18 02/25] x86/cet/shstk: Add Kconfig option for user-mode control-flow protection
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STALE2097d
SUPERSEDED
From: Yu-cheng Yu <hidden>
Date: 2021-01-27 21:28:44
Also in:
linux-api, linux-arch, linux-mm, lkml
Subsystem:
the rest, x86 architecture (32-bit and 64-bit) · Maintainers:
Linus Torvalds, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, Borislav Petkov, Dave Hansen
Status: Superseded by v30 (posted 2021-08-30). [go to v30]
Revision v18 (25 revisions archived).
Revisions (25)
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Shadow Stack provides protection against function return address
corruption. It is active when the processor supports it, the kernel has
CONFIG_X86_CET enabled, and the application is built for the feature.
This is only implemented for the 64-bit kernel. When it is enabled, legacy
non-Shadow Stack applications continue to work, but without protection.
Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <redacted>
---
arch/x86/Kconfig | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++
arch/x86/Kconfig.assembler | 5 +++++
2 files changed, 27 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index 21f851179ff0..2d080a2335df 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig@@ -1951,6 +1951,28 @@ config X86_SGX If unsure, say N. +config ARCH_HAS_SHADOW_STACK + def_bool n + +config X86_CET + prompt "Intel Control-flow protection for user-mode" + def_bool n + depends on CPU_SUP_INTEL && X86_64 + depends on AS_WRUSS + select ARCH_USES_HIGH_VMA_FLAGS + select ARCH_HAS_SHADOW_STACK + help + Control-flow protection is a hardware security hardening feature + that detects function-return address or jump target changes by + malicious code. Applications must be enabled to use it, and old + userspace does not get protection "for free". + Support for this feature is present on processors released in + 2020 or later. Enabling this feature increases kernel text size + by 3.7 KB. + See Documentation/x86/intel_cet.rst for more information. + + If unsure, say N. + config EFI bool "EFI runtime service support" depends on ACPI
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig.assembler b/arch/x86/Kconfig.assembler
index 26b8c08e2fc4..00c79dd93651 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig.assembler
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig.assembler@@ -19,3 +19,8 @@ config AS_TPAUSE def_bool $(as-instr,tpause %ecx) help Supported by binutils >= 2.31.1 and LLVM integrated assembler >= V7 + +config AS_WRUSS + def_bool $(as-instr,wrussq %rax$(comma)(%rbx)) + help + Supported by binutils >= 2.31 and LLVM integrated assembler
--
2.21.0