On Mon, Aug 6, 2018 at 10:45 AM, Robin Murphy [off-list ref] wrote:
I guess what I'm getting at is that if the protection mechanism is "always
return with SP outside TTBR1", there seems little point in going through the
motions if SP in TTBR0 could still be valid and allow an attack to succeed
anyway; this is basically just me working through a justification for saying
the proposed scheme needs "depends on ARM64_PAN || ARM64_SW_TTBR0_PAN",
making it that much uglier for v8.0 CPUs...
I think anyone with v8.0 CPUs interested in this mitigation would also
very much want PAN emulation. If a "depends on" isn't desired, what
about "imply" in the Kconfig?
-Kees
--
Kees Cook
Pixel Security