[RFC/PoC PATCH 0/3] arm64: basic ROP mitigation

From
Ard Biesheuvel <hidden>
Date
2018-08-06 15:50:16
Reply to
Robin Murphy, 2018-08-06
On 6 August 2018 at 17:38, Robin Murphy [off-list ref] wrote:
On 06/08/18 15:04, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
quoted
On 6 August 2018 at 15:55, Robin Murphy [off-list ref] wrote:
quoted
On 02/08/18 14:21, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
quoted

This is a proof of concept I cooked up, primarily to trigger a
discussion
about whether there is a point to doing anything like this, and if there
is, what the pitfalls are. Also, while I am not aware of any similar
implementations, the idea is so simple that I would be surprised if
nobody
else thought of the same thing way before I did.


So, "TTBR0 PAN: Pointer Auth edition"? :P
quoted
The idea is that we can significantly limit the kernel's attack surface
for ROP based attacks by clearing the stack pointer's sign bit before
returning from a function, and setting it again right after proceeding
from the [expected] return address. This should make it much more
difficult
to return to arbitrary gadgets, given that they rely on being chained to
the next via a return address popped off the stack, and this is
difficult
when the stack pointer is invalid.

Of course, 4 additional instructions per function return is not exactly
for free, but they are just movs and adds, and leaf functions are
disregarded unless they allocate a stack frame (this comes for free
because simple_return insns are disregarded by the plugin)

Please shoot, preferably with better ideas ...


Actually, on the subject of PAN, shouldn't this at least have a very hard
dependency on that? AFAICS without PAN clearing bit 55 of SP is
effectively
giving userspace direct control of the kernel stack (thanks to TBI).
Ouch.
How's that? Bits 52 .. 54 will still be set, so SP will never contain
a valid userland address in any case. Or am I missing something?

Ah, yes, I'd managed to forget about the address hole, but I think that only
makes it a bit trickier, rather than totally safe - it feels like you just
need to chain one or two returns through "valid" targets until you can hit
an epilogue with a "mov sp, x29" (at first glance there are a fair few of
those in my vmlinux), after which we're back to the bit 55 scheme alone
giving no protection against retargeting the stack to a valid TTBR0 address.
Wouldn't such an epilogue clear the SP bit before returning again?
quoted
quoted
I wonder if there's a little  more mileage in using "{add,sub} sp, sp,
#1"
sequences to rely on stack alignment exceptions instead, with the added
bonus that that's about as low as the instruction-level overhead can get.
Good point. I did consider that, but couldn't convince myself that it
isn't easier to defeat: loads via x29 occur reasonably often, and you
can simply offset your doctored stack frame by a single byte.

True; in theory there are 3072 possible unaligned offsets to choose from,
but compile-time randomisation doesn't seem much use, and hotpatching just
about every function call in the kernel isn't a nice thought either.

Robin.
Thread (19 messages) 19 messages, 5 authors, last reply 2018-08-20
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