On 6 August 2018 at 15:55, Robin Murphy [off-list ref] wrote:
On 02/08/18 14:21, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
quoted
This is a proof of concept I cooked up, primarily to trigger a discussion
about whether there is a point to doing anything like this, and if there
is, what the pitfalls are. Also, while I am not aware of any similar
implementations, the idea is so simple that I would be surprised if nobody
else thought of the same thing way before I did.
So, "TTBR0 PAN: Pointer Auth edition"? :P
quoted
The idea is that we can significantly limit the kernel's attack surface
for ROP based attacks by clearing the stack pointer's sign bit before
returning from a function, and setting it again right after proceeding
from the [expected] return address. This should make it much more
difficult
to return to arbitrary gadgets, given that they rely on being chained to
the next via a return address popped off the stack, and this is difficult
when the stack pointer is invalid.
Of course, 4 additional instructions per function return is not exactly
for free, but they are just movs and adds, and leaf functions are
disregarded unless they allocate a stack frame (this comes for free
because simple_return insns are disregarded by the plugin)
Please shoot, preferably with better ideas ...
Actually, on the subject of PAN, shouldn't this at least have a very hard
dependency on that? AFAICS without PAN clearing bit 55 of SP is effectively
giving userspace direct control of the kernel stack (thanks to TBI). Ouch.
How's that? Bits 52 .. 54 will still be set, so SP will never contain
a valid userland address in any case. Or am I missing something?
I wonder if there's a little more mileage in using "{add,sub} sp, sp, #1"
sequences to rely on stack alignment exceptions instead, with the added
bonus that that's about as low as the instruction-level overhead can get.
Good point. I did consider that, but couldn't convince myself that it
isn't easier to defeat: loads via x29 occur reasonably often, and you
can simply offset your doctored stack frame by a single byte.
quoted
Ard Biesheuvel (3):
arm64: use wrapper macro for bl/blx instructions from asm code
gcc: plugins: add ROP shield plugin for arm64
arm64: enable ROP protection by clearing SP bit #55 across function
returns
arch/Kconfig | 4 +
arch/arm64/Kconfig | 10 ++
arch/arm64/include/asm/assembler.h | 21 +++-
arch/arm64/kernel/entry-ftrace.S | 6 +-
arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S | 104 +++++++++-------
arch/arm64/kernel/head.S | 4 +-
arch/arm64/kernel/probes/kprobes_trampoline.S | 2 +-
arch/arm64/kernel/sleep.S | 6 +-
drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile | 3 +-
scripts/Makefile.gcc-plugins | 7 ++
scripts/gcc-plugins/arm64_rop_shield_plugin.c | 116 ++++++++++++++++++
11 files changed, 228 insertions(+), 55 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 scripts/gcc-plugins/arm64_rop_shield_plugin.c