[PATCH v7 7/9] seccomp: implement SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC
From: Kees Cook <hidden>
Date: 2014-06-24 18:05:26
Also in:
linux-api, linux-arch, linux-mips, lkml
On Tue, Jun 24, 2014 at 10:27 AM, Oleg Nesterov [off-list ref] wrote:
On 06/23, Kees Cook wrote:quoted
+static pid_t seccomp_can_sync_threads(void) +{ + struct task_struct *thread, *caller; + + BUG_ON(write_can_lock(&tasklist_lock)); + BUG_ON(!spin_is_locked(¤t->sighand->siglock)); + + if (current->seccomp.mode != SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER) + return -EACCES; + + /* Validate all threads being eligible for synchronization. */ + thread = caller = current; + for_each_thread(caller, thread) { + pid_t failed; + + if (thread->seccomp.mode == SECCOMP_MODE_DISABLED || + (thread->seccomp.mode == SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER && + is_ancestor(thread->seccomp.filter, + caller->seccomp.filter))) + continue; + + /* Return the first thread that cannot be synchronized. */ + failed = task_pid_vnr(thread); + /* If the pid cannot be resolved, then return -ESRCH */ + if (failed == 0) + failed = -ESRCH;forgot to mention, task_pid_vnr() can't fail. sighand->siglock is held, for_each_thread() can't see a thread which has passed unhash_process().
Certainly good to know, but I'd be much more comfortable leaving this check as-is. Having "failed" return with "0" would be very very bad (userspace would think the filter had been successfully applied, etc). I'd rather stay highly defensive here. -Kees -- Kees Cook Chrome OS Security