On Tue, Jun 24, 2014 at 10:27 AM, Oleg Nesterov [off-list ref] wrote:
On 06/23, Kees Cook wrote:
quoted
+static pid_t seccomp_can_sync_threads(void)
+{
+ struct task_struct *thread, *caller;
+
+ BUG_ON(write_can_lock(&tasklist_lock));
+ BUG_ON(!spin_is_locked(¤t->sighand->siglock));
+
+ if (current->seccomp.mode != SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER)
+ return -EACCES;
+
+ /* Validate all threads being eligible for synchronization. */
+ thread = caller = current;
+ for_each_thread(caller, thread) {
+ pid_t failed;
+
+ if (thread->seccomp.mode == SECCOMP_MODE_DISABLED ||
+ (thread->seccomp.mode == SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER &&
+ is_ancestor(thread->seccomp.filter,
+ caller->seccomp.filter)))
+ continue;
+
+ /* Return the first thread that cannot be synchronized. */
+ failed = task_pid_vnr(thread);
+ /* If the pid cannot be resolved, then return -ESRCH */
+ if (failed == 0)
+ failed = -ESRCH;
forgot to mention, task_pid_vnr() can't fail. sighand->siglock is held,
for_each_thread() can't see a thread which has passed unhash_process().
Certainly good to know, but I'd be much more comfortable leaving this
check as-is. Having "failed" return with "0" would be very very bad
(userspace would think the filter had been successfully applied, etc).
I'd rather stay highly defensive here.
-Kees
--
Kees Cook
Chrome OS Security