On Tue, Jun 24, 2014 at 11:30 AM, Oleg Nesterov [off-list ref] wrote:
I am puzzled by the usage of smp_load_acquire(),
It was recommended by Andy Lutomirski in preference to ACCESS_ONCE().
On 06/23, Kees Cook wrote:
quoted
static u32 seccomp_run_filters(int syscall)
{
- struct seccomp_filter *f;
+ struct seccomp_filter *f = smp_load_acquire(¤t->seccomp.filter);
struct seccomp_data sd;
u32 ret = SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW;
/* Ensure unexpected behavior doesn't result in failing open. */
- if (WARN_ON(current->seccomp.filter == NULL))
+ if (WARN_ON(f == NULL))
return SECCOMP_RET_KILL;
populate_seccomp_data(&sd);@@ -186,9 +186,8 @@ static u32 seccomp_run_filters(int syscall)
* All filters in the list are evaluated and the lowest BPF return
* value always takes priority (ignoring the DATA).
*/
- for (f = current->seccomp.filter; f; f = f->prev) {
+ for (; f; f = smp_load_acquire(&f->prev)) {
u32 cur_ret = SK_RUN_FILTER(f->prog, (void *)&sd);
-
if ((cur_ret & SECCOMP_RET_ACTION) < (ret & SECCOMP_RET_ACTION))
ret = cur_ret;
OK, in this case the 1st one is probably fine, altgough it is not
clear to me why it is better than read_barrier_depends().
But why do we need a 2nd one inside the loop? And if we actually need
it (I don't think so) then why it is safe to use f->prog without
load_acquire ?
You're right -- it should not be possible for for any of the ->prev
pointers to change.
quoted
void get_seccomp_filter(struct task_struct *tsk)
{
- struct seccomp_filter *orig = tsk->seccomp.filter;
+ struct seccomp_filter *orig = smp_load_acquire(&tsk->seccomp.filter);
if (!orig)
return;
This one looks unneeded.
First of all, afaics atomic_inc() should work correctly without any barriers,
otherwise it is buggy. But even this doesn't matter.
With this changes get_seccomp_filter() must be called under ->siglock, it can't
race with add-filter and thus tsk->seccomp.filter should be stable.
Excellent point, yes. I'll remove that.
quoted
/* Reference count is bounded by the number of total processes. */
@@ -361,7 +364,7 @@ void put_seccomp_filter(struct task_struct *tsk)
/* Clean up single-reference branches iteratively. */
while (orig && atomic_dec_and_test(&orig->usage)) {
struct seccomp_filter *freeme = orig;
- orig = orig->prev;
+ orig = smp_load_acquire(&orig->prev);
seccomp_filter_free(freeme);
}
This one looks unneeded too. And note that this patch does not add
smp_load_acquire() to read tsk->seccomp.filter.
Hrm, yes, that should get added.
atomic_dec_and_test() adds mb(), we do not need more barriers to access
->prev ?
Right, same situation as the run_filters loop. Thanks!
-Kees
--
Kees Cook
Chrome OS Security