Re: [PATCH 2/3] lsm: introduce security_lsm_manage_policy hook
From: Maxime Bélair <hidden>
Date: 2025-05-07 15:38:00
Also in:
linux-security-module, lkml
On 5/7/25 12:40, Tetsuo Handa wrote:
On 2025/05/06 23:32, Maxime Bélair wrote:quoted
diff --git a/security/lsm_syscalls.c b/security/lsm_syscalls.c index dcaad8818679..b39e6635a7d5 100644 --- a/security/lsm_syscalls.c +++ b/security/lsm_syscalls.c@@ -122,5 +122,10 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(lsm_list_modules, u64 __user *, ids, u32 __user *, size, SYSCALL_DEFINE5(lsm_manage_policy, u32, lsm_id, u32, op, void __user *, buf, u32 __user *, size, u32, flags) { - return 0; + size_t usize; + + if (get_user(usize, size)) + return -EFAULT; + + return security_lsm_manage_policy(lsm_id, op, buf, usize, flags); }syzbot will report user-controlled unbounded huge size memory allocation attempt. ;-) This interface might be fine for AppArmor, but TOMOYO won't use this interface because TOMOYO's policy is line-oriented ASCII text data where the destination is switched via pseudo‑filesystem's filename; use of filename helps restricting which type of policy can be manipulated by which process.
First, like any LSM, TOMOYO is not obliged to implement every operation. It can simply expose the one that makes sense for its use case. For instance, I don't think it needs an equivalent of the manager interface. If TOMOYO wants to support several sub‑operations, it can distinguish them with the syscall’s flags parameter instead of filenames (as securityfs_if.c does today) and reuse the code already employed by its pseudo‑fs, as in the AppArmor patch. Supporting this syscall would therefore require only minimal changes. Line‑oriented ASCII text is not a barrier, either. The syscall can pass that format just fine. Because a typical TOMOYO line is very small, the performance gains from using the syscall are actually greater. A brief benchmark is available in [1]. Thanks, Maxime [1] https://gitlab.com/-/snippets/4840792