On Thu, 2023-03-09 at 13:08 -0800, Deepak Gupta wrote:

On Thu, Mar 09, 2023 at 07:39:41PM +0000, Edgecombe, Rick P wrote:

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On Thu, 2023-03-09 at 10:55 -0800, Deepak Gupta wrote:

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On Thu, Mar 02, 2023 at 05:22:07PM +0000, Szabolcs Nagy wrote:

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The 02/27/2023 14:29, Rick Edgecombe wrote:

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Previously, a new PROT_SHADOW_STACK was attempted,

...

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So rather than repurpose two existing syscalls (mmap,
madvise)
that don't
quite fit, just implement a new map_shadow_stack syscall to
allow
userspace to map and setup new shadow stacks in one step.
While
ucontext
is the primary motivator, userspace may have other unforeseen
reasons to
setup it's own shadow stacks using the WRSS instruction.
Towards
this
provide a flag so that stacks can be optionally setup
securely
for the
common case of ucontext without enabling WRSS. Or potentially
have the
kernel set up the shadow stack in some new way.

...

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The following example demonstrates how to create a new shadow
stack with
map_shadow_stack:
void *shstk = map_shadow_stack(addr, stack_size,
SHADOW_STACK_SET_TOKEN);

i think

mmap(addr, size, PROT_READ, MAP_ANON|MAP_SHADOW_STACK, -1, 0);

could do the same with less disruption to users (new syscalls
are harder to deal with than new flags). it would do the
guard page and initial token setup too (there is no flag for
it but could be squeezed in).

Discussion on this topic in v6

https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230223000340.GB945966@debug.ba.rivosinc.com/ (local)

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Again I know earlier CET patches had protection flag and somehow
due
to pushback
on mailing list,
 it was adopted to go for special syscall because no one else
had shadow stack.

Seeing a response from Szabolcs, I am assuming arm4 would also
want
to follow
using mmap to manufacture shadow stack. For reference RFC patches
for
risc-v shadow stack,
use a new protection flag = PROT_SHADOWSTACK.

https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20230213045351.3945824-1-debug@rivosinc.com/ (local)

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I know earlier discussion had been that we let this go and do a
re-
factor later as other
arch support trickle in. But as I thought more on this and I
think it
may just be
messy from user mode point of view as well to have cognition of
two
different ways of
creating shadow stack. One would be special syscall (in current
libc)
and another `mmap`
(whenever future re-factor happens)

If it's not too late, it would be more wise to take `mmap`
approach rather than special `syscall` approach.

There is sort of two things intermixed here when we talk about a
PROT_SHADOW_STACK.

One is: what is the interface for specifying how the shadow stack
should be provisioned with data? Right now there are two ways
supported, all zero or with an X86 shadow stack restore token at
the
end. Then there was already some conversation about a third type.
In
which case the question would be is using mmap MAP_ flags the right
place for this? How many types of initialization will be needed in
the
end and what is the overlap between the architectures?

First of all, arches can choose to have token at the bottom or not.

Token serve following purposes
  - It allows one to put desired value in shadow stack pointer in
safe/secure manner.
    Note: x86 doesn't provide any opcode encoding to value in SSP
register. So having
    a token is kind of a necessity because x86 doesn't easily allow
writing shadow stack.

  - A token at the bottom acts marker / barrier and can be useful in
debugging

  - If (and a big *if*) we ever reach a point in future where return
address is only pushed
    on shadow stack (x86 should have motivation to do this because
less uops on call/ret),
    a token at the bottom (bottom means lower address) is ensuring
sure shot way of getting
    a fault when exhausted.

Current RISCV zisslpcfi proposal doesn't define CPU based tokens
because it's RISC.
It allows mechanisms using which software can define formatting of
token for itself.
Not sure of what ARM is doing.

Ok, so riscv doesn't need to have the kernel write the token, but x86
does.

Now coming to the point of all zero v/s shadow stack token.
Why not always have token at the bottom?

With WRSS you can setup the shadow stack however you want. So the user
would then have to take care to erase the token if they didn't want it.
Not the end of the world, but kind of clunky if there is no reason for
it.

In case of x86, Why need for two ways and why not always have a token
at the bottom.
The way x86 is going, user mode is responsible for establishing
shadow stack and thus
whenever shadow stack is created then if x86 kernel implementation
always place a token
at the base/bottom.

There was also some discussion recently of adding a token AND an end of
stack marker, as a potential solution for backtracing in ucontext
stacks. In this case it could cause an ABI break to just start adding
the end of stack marker where the token was, and so would require a new
map_shadow_stack flag.

Now user mode can do following:--
  - If it has access to WRSS, it can sure go ahead and create a token
of its choosing and
    overwrite kernel created token. and then do RSTORSSP on it's own
created token.

  - If it doesn't have access to WRSS (and dont need to create its
own token), it can do
    RSTORSSP on this. As soon as it does, no other thread in process
can restore to it.
    On `fork`, you get the same un-restorable token.

So why not always have a token at the bottom.
This is my plan for riscv implementation as well (to have a token at
the bottom)

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The other thing is: should shadow stack memory creation be tightly
controlled? For example in x86 we limit this to anonymous memory,
etc.
Some reasons for this are x86 specific, but some are not. So if we
disallow most of the options why allow the interface to take them?
And
then you are in the position of carefully maintaining a list of
not-
allowed options instead letting a list of allowed options sit
there.

I am new to linux kernel and thus may be not able to follow the
argument of
limiting to anonymous memory.

Why is limiting it to anonymous memory a problem. IIRC, ARM's
PROT_MTE is applicable
only to anonymous memory. I can probably find few more examples. 

Oh I see, they have a special arch VMA flag VM_MTE_ALLOWED that only
gets set if all the rules are followed. Then PROT_MTE can only be set
on that to set VM_MTE. That is kind of nice because certain other
special situations can choose to support it.

It does take another arch vma flag though. For x86 I guess I would need
to figure out how to squeeze VM_SHADOW_STACK into other flags to have a
free flag to use the same method. It also only supports mprotect() and
shadow stack would only want to support mmap(). And you still have the
initialization stuff to plumb through. Yea, I think the PROT_MTE is a
good thing to consider, but it's not super obvious to me how similar
the logic would be for shadow stack.

The question I'm asking though is, not "can mmap code and rules be
changed to enforce the required limitations?". I think it is yes. But
the question is "why is that plumbing better than a new syscall?". I
guess to get a better idea, the mmap solution would need to get POCed.
I had half done this at one point, but abandoned the approach.

For your question about why limit it, the special x86 case is the
Dirty=1,Write=0 PTE bit combination for shadow stacks. So for shadow
stack you could have some confusion about whether a PTE is actually
dirty for writeback, etc. I wouldn't say it's known to be impossible to
do MAP_SHARED, but it has not been fully analyzed enough to know what
the changes would be. There were some solvable concrete issues that
tipped the scale as well. It was also not expected to be a common
usage, if at all.

The non-x86, general reasons for it, are for a smaller benefit. It
blocks a lot of ways shadow stack memory could be written to. Like say
you have a memory mapped writable file, and you also map it shadow
stack. So it has better security properties depending on what your
threat model is.

Eventually syscall will also go ahead and use memory management code
to
perform mapping. So I didn't understand the reasoning here. The way
syscall
can limit it to anonymous memory, why mmap can't do the same if it
sees
PROT_SHADOWSTACK.

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The only benefit I've heard is that it saves creating a new
syscall,
but it also saves several MAP_ flags. That, and that the RFC for
riscv
did a PROT_SHADOW_STACK to start. So, yes, two people asked the
same
question, but I'm still not seeing any benefits. Can you give the
pros
and cons please?

Again the way syscall will limit it to anonymous memory, Why mmap
can't do same?
There is precedence for it (like PROT_MTE is applicable only to
anonymous memory)

So if it can be done, then why introduce a new syscall?

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BTW, in glibc map_shadow_stack is called from arch code. So I think
userspace wise, for this to affect other architectures there would
need
to be some code that could do things generically, with somehow the
shadow stack pivot abstracted but the shadow stack allocation not.

Agreed, yes it can be done in a way where it won't put tax on other
architectures.

But what about fragmentation within x86. Will x86 always choose to
use system call
method map shadow stack. If future re-factor results in x86 also use
`mmap` method.
Isn't it a mess for x86 glibc to figure out what to do; whether to
use system call
or `mmap`?

Ok, so this is the downside I guess. What happens if we want to support
the other types of memory in the future and end up using mmap for this?
Then we have 15-20 lines of extra syscall wrapping code to maintain to
support legacy.

For the mmap solution, we have the downside of using extra MAP_ flags,
and *some* amount of currently unknown vm_flag and address range logic,
plus mmap arch breakouts to add to core MM. Like I said earlier, you
would need to POC it out to see how bad that looks and get some core MM
feedback on the new type of MAP flag usage. But, syscalls being pretty
straightforward, it would probably be *some* amount of added complexity
_now_ to support something that might happen in the future. I'm not
seeing either one as a landslide win.

It's kind of an eternal software design philosophical question, isn't
it? How much work should you do to prepare for things that might be
needed in the future? From what I've seen the balance in the kernel
seems to be to try not to paint yourself in to an ABI corner, but
otherwise let the kernel evolve naturally in response to real usages.
If anyone wants to correct this, please do. But otherwise I think the
new syscall is aligned with that.

TBH, you are making me wonder if I'm missing something. It seems you
strongly don't prefer this approach, but I'm not hearing any huge
potential negative impacts. And you also say it won't tax the riscv
implementation. Is this just something just smells bad here? Or it
would shrink the riscv series?