Re: [PATCH v6 4/8] KVM: Extend the memslot to support fd-based private memory
From: Michael Roth <hidden>
Date: 2022-06-24 13:02:12
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kvm, linux-doc, linux-fsdevel, linux-mm, lkml, qemu-devel
On Fri, Jun 24, 2022 at 04:54:26PM +0800, Chao Peng wrote:
On Thu, Jun 23, 2022 at 05:59:49PM -0500, Michael Roth wrote:quoted
On Fri, May 20, 2022 at 06:31:02PM +0000, Sean Christopherson wrote:quoted
On Fri, May 20, 2022, Andy Lutomirski wrote:quoted
The alternative would be to have some kind of separate table or bitmap (part of the memslot?) that tells KVM whether a GPA should map to the fd. What do you all think?My original proposal was to have expolicit shared vs. private memslots, and punch holes in KVM's memslots on conversion, but due to the way KVM (and userspace) handle memslot updates, conversions would be painfully slow. That's how we ended up with the current propsoal. But a dedicated KVM ioctl() to add/remove shared ranges would be easy to implement and wouldn't necessarily even need to interact with the memslots. It could be a consumer of memslots, e.g. if we wanted to disallow registering regions without an associated memslot, but I think we'd want to avoid even that because things will get messy during memslot updates, e.g. if dirty logging is toggled or a shared memory region is temporarily removed then we wouldn't want to destroy the tracking. I don't think we'd want to use a bitmap, e.g. for a well-behaved guest, XArray should be far more efficient. One benefit to explicitly tracking this in KVM is that it might be useful for software-only protected VMs, e.g. KVM could mark a region in the XArray as "pending" based on guest hypercalls to share/unshare memory, and then complete the transaction when userspace invokes the ioctl() to complete the share/unshare.Another upside to implementing a KVM ioctl is basically the reverse of the discussion around avoiding double-allocations: *supporting* double-allocations. One thing I noticed while testing SNP+UPM support is a fairly dramatic slow-down with how it handles OVMF, which does some really nasty stuff with DMA where it takes 1 or 2 pages and flips them between shared/private on every transaction. Obviously that's not ideal and should be fixed directly at some point, but it's something that exists in the wild and might not be the only such instance where we need to deal with that sort of usage pattern. With the current implementation, one option I had to address this was to disable hole-punching in QEMU when doing shared->private conversions: Boot time from 1GB guest: SNP: 32s SNP+UPM: 1m43s SNP+UPM (disable shared discard): 1m08s Of course, we don't have the option of disabling discard/hole-punching for private memory to see if we get similar gains there, since that also doubles as the interface for doing private->shared conversions.Private should be the same, minus time consumed for private memory, the data should be close to SNP case. You can't try that in current version due to we rely on the existence of the private page to tell a page is private.quoted
A separate KVM ioctl to decouple these 2 things would allow for that, and allow for a way for userspace to implement things like batched/lazy-discard of previously-converted pages to deal with cases like these.The planned ioctl includes two responsibilities: - Mark the range as private/shared - Zap the existing SLPT mapping for the range Whether doing the hole-punching or not on the fd is unrelated to this ioctl, userspace has freedom to do that or not. Since we don't reply on the fact that private memoy should have been allocated, we can support lazy faulting and don't need explicit fallocate(). That means, whether the memory is discarded or not in the memory backing store is not required by KVM, but be a userspace option.
Nice, that sounds promising.
quoted
Another motivator for these separate ioctl is that, since we're considering 'out-of-band' interactions with private memfd where userspace might erroneously/inadvertently do things like double allocations, another thing it might do is pre-allocating pages in the private memfd prior to associating the memfd with a private memslot. Since the notifiers aren't registered until that point, any associated callbacks that would normally need to be done as part of those fallocate() notification would be missed unless we do something like 'replay' all the notifications once the private memslot is registered and associating with a memfile notifier. But that seems a bit ugly, and I'm not sure how well that would work. This also seems to hint at this additional 'conversion' state being something that should be owned and managed directly by KVM rather than hooking into the allocations.Right, once we move the private/shared state into KVM then we don't rely on those callbacks so the 'replay' thing is unneeded. fallocate() notification is useless for sure, invalidate() is likely still needed, just like the invalidate for mmu_notifier to bump the mmu_seq and do the zap.
Ok, yah, makes sense that we'd still up needing the invalidation hooks.
quoted
It would also nicely solve the question of how to handle in-place encryption, since unlike userspace, KVM is perfectly capable of copying data from shared->private prior to conversion / guest start, and disallowing such things afterward. Would just need an extra flag basically.Agree it's possible to do additional copy during the conversion but I'm not so confident this is urgent and the right API. Currently TDX does not have this need. Maybe as the first step just add the conversion itself. Adding additional feature like this can always be possible whenever we are clear.
That seems fair. In the meantime we can adopt the approach proposed by Sean and Vishal[1] and handle it directly in the relevant SNP KVM ioctls. If we end up keeping that approach we'll probably want to make sure these KVM-driven 'implicit' conversions are documented in the KVM/SNP API so that userspace can account for it in it's view of what's private/shared. In this case at least it's pretty obvious, just thinking of when other archs and VMMs utilizing this more. Thanks! -Mike [1] https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/20220524205646.1798325-4-vannapurve@google.com/T/#m1e9bb782b1bea66c36ae7c4c9f4f0c35c2d7e338 (local)
Thanks, Chao