Re: [PATCH v12 8/8] x86: Disallow vsyscall emulation when CET is enabled
From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Date: 2020-09-21 23:48:40
Also in:
linux-arch, linux-doc, linux-mm, lkml
On Mon, Sep 21, 2020 at 3:37 PM Yu-cheng Yu [off-list ref] wrote:
quoted hunk ↗ jump to hunk
On Mon, 2020-09-21 at 09:22 -0700, Yu, Yu-cheng wrote:quoted
On 9/18/2020 5:11 PM, Andy Lutomirski wrote:quoted
On Fri, Sep 18, 2020 at 12:23 PM Yu-cheng Yu [off-list ref] wrote:quoted
Emulation of the legacy vsyscall page is required by some programs built before 2013. Newer programs after 2013 don't use it. Disable vsyscall emulation when Control-flow Enforcement (CET) is enabled to enhance security. Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <redacted>[...]quoted
quoted
Nope, try again. Having IBT on does *not* mean that every library in the process knows that we have indirect branch tracking. The legacy bitmap exists for a reason. Also, I want a way to flag programs as not using the vsyscall page, but that flag should not be called CET. And a process with vsyscalls off should not be able to read the vsyscall page, and /proc/self/maps should be correct. So you have some choices: 1. Drop this patch and make it work. 2. Add a real per-process vsyscall control. Either make it depend on vsyscall=xonly and wire it up correctly or actually make it work correctly with vsyscall=emulate. NAK to any hacks in this space. Do it right or don't do it at all.We can drop this patch, and bring back the previous patch that fixes up shadow stack and ibt. That makes vsyscall emulation work correctly, and does not force the application to do anything different from what is working now. I will post the previous patch as a reply to this thread so that people can make comments on it. Yu-chengHere is the patch: ------ From dfdee39c795ee5dcee2c77f6ba344a61f4d8124b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Yu-cheng Yu <redacted> Date: Thu, 29 Nov 2018 14:15:38 -0800 Subject: [PATCH 34/43] x86/vsyscall/64: Fixup Shadow Stack and Indirect Branch Tracking for vsyscall emulation Vsyscall entry points are effectively branch targets. Mark them with ENDBR64 opcodes. When emulating the RET instruction, unwind the shadow stack and reset IBT state machine. Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <redacted> --- arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c | 29 +++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_emu_64.S | 9 +++++++ arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_trace.h | 1 + 3 files changed, 39 insertions(+)diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.cb/arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c index 44c33103a955..0131c9f7f9c5 100644--- a/arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c +++ b/arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c@@ -38,6 +38,9 @@ #include <asm/fixmap.h> #include <asm/traps.h> #include <asm/paravirt.h> +#include <asm/fpu/xstate.h> +#include <asm/fpu/types.h> +#include <asm/fpu/internal.h> #define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS #include "vsyscall_trace.h"@@ -286,6 +289,32 @@ bool emulate_vsyscall(unsigned long error_code, /* Emulate a ret instruction. */ regs->ip = caller; regs->sp += 8; + + if (current->thread.cet.shstk_size || + current->thread.cet.ibt_enabled) { + u64 r; + + fpregs_lock(); + if (test_thread_flag(TIF_NEED_FPU_LOAD)) + __fpregs_load_activate();
Wouldn't this be nicer if you operated on the memory image, not the registers?
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_BRANCH_TRACKING_USER
+ /* Fixup branch tracking */
+ if (current->thread.cet.ibt_enabled) {
+ rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_U_CET, r);
+ wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_U_CET, r & ~CET_WAIT_ENDBR);
+ }
+#endifSeems reasonable on first glance.
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_SHADOW_STACK_USER
+ /* Unwind shadow stack. */
+ if (current->thread.cet.shstk_size) {
+ rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP, r);
+ wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP, r + 8);
+ }
+#endifWhat happens if the result is noncanonical? A quick skim of the SDM didn't find anything. This latter issue goes away if you operate on the memory image, though -- writing a bogus value is just fine, since the FP restore will handle it.