Re: [PATCH v12 8/8] x86: Disallow vsyscall emulation when CET is enabled

[PATCH v12 0/8] Control-flow Enforcement: Indirect Branch Tracking · Yu-cheng Yu <hidden> · 2020-09-18
[PATCH v12 5/8] x86/cet/ibt: Update arch_prctl functions for Indirect Branch Tracking · Yu-cheng Yu <hidden> · 2020-09-18
[PATCH v12 4/8] x86/cet/ibt: ELF header parsing for Indirect Branch Tracking · Yu-cheng Yu <hidden> · 2020-09-18
[PATCH v12 8/8] x86: Disallow vsyscall emulation when CET is enabled · Yu-cheng Yu <hidden> · 2020-09-18
Re: [PATCH v12 8/8] x86: Disallow vsyscall emulation when CET is enabled · Dave Hansen <hidden> · 2020-09-18
Re: [PATCH v12 8/8] x86: Disallow vsyscall emulation when CET is enabled · Pavel Machek <hidden> · 2020-09-18
Re: [PATCH v12 8/8] x86: Disallow vsyscall emulation when CET is enabled · H.J. Lu <hidden> · 2020-09-18
Re: [PATCH v12 8/8] x86: Disallow vsyscall emulation when CET is enabled · Dave Hansen <hidden> · 2020-09-18
Re: [PATCH v12 8/8] x86: Disallow vsyscall emulation when CET is enabled · H.J. Lu <hidden> · 2020-09-18
Re: [PATCH v12 8/8] x86: Disallow vsyscall emulation when CET is enabled · Dave Hansen <hidden> · 2020-09-18
Re: [PATCH v12 8/8] x86: Disallow vsyscall emulation when CET is enabled · Yu, Yu-cheng <hidden> · 2020-09-18
Re: [PATCH v12 8/8] x86: Disallow vsyscall emulation when CET is enabled · Pavel Machek <hidden> · 2020-09-18
Re: [PATCH v12 8/8] x86: Disallow vsyscall emulation when CET is enabled · Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> · 2020-09-19
Re: [PATCH v12 8/8] x86: Disallow vsyscall emulation when CET is enabled · Yu, Yu-cheng <hidden> · 2020-09-21
Re: [PATCH v12 8/8] x86: Disallow vsyscall emulation when CET is enabled · Yu-cheng Yu <hidden> · 2020-09-21
Re: [PATCH v12 8/8] x86: Disallow vsyscall emulation when CET is enabled · Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> · 2020-09-21
Re: [PATCH v12 8/8] x86: Disallow vsyscall emulation when CET is enabled · Sean Christopherson <hidden> · 2020-09-23
[PATCH v12 1/8] x86/cet/ibt: Add Kconfig option for user-mode Indirect Branch Tracking · Yu-cheng Yu <hidden> · 2020-09-18
Re: [PATCH v12 1/8] x86/cet/ibt: Add Kconfig option for user-mode Indirect Branch Tracking · Randy Dunlap <hidden> · 2020-09-18
Re: [PATCH v12 1/8] x86/cet/ibt: Add Kconfig option for user-mode Indirect Branch Tracking · Pavel Machek <hidden> · 2020-09-18
Re: [PATCH v12 1/8] x86/cet/ibt: Add Kconfig option for user-mode Indirect Branch Tracking · H.J. Lu <hidden> · 2020-09-18
Re: [PATCH v12 1/8] x86/cet/ibt: Add Kconfig option for user-mode Indirect Branch Tracking · Pavel Machek <hidden> · 2020-09-18
Re: [PATCH v12 1/8] x86/cet/ibt: Add Kconfig option for user-mode Indirect Branch Tracking · H.J. Lu <hidden> · 2020-09-18
Re: [PATCH v12 1/8] x86/cet/ibt: Add Kconfig option for user-mode Indirect Branch Tracking · Yu, Yu-cheng <hidden> · 2020-09-18
Re: [PATCH v12 1/8] x86/cet/ibt: Add Kconfig option for user-mode Indirect Branch Tracking · Pavel Machek <hidden> · 2020-09-18
Re: [PATCH v12 1/8] x86/cet/ibt: Add Kconfig option for user-mode Indirect Branch Tracking · H.J. Lu <hidden> · 2020-09-18
Re: [PATCH v12 1/8] x86/cet/ibt: Add Kconfig option for user-mode Indirect Branch Tracking · Pavel Machek <hidden> · 2020-09-18
Re: [PATCH v12 1/8] x86/cet/ibt: Add Kconfig option for user-mode Indirect Branch Tracking · Yu, Yu-cheng <hidden> · 2020-09-21
Re: [PATCH v12 1/8] x86/cet/ibt: Add Kconfig option for user-mode Indirect Branch Tracking · Dave Hansen <hidden> · 2020-09-21
Re: [PATCH v12 1/8] x86/cet/ibt: Add Kconfig option for user-mode Indirect Branch Tracking · Yu, Yu-cheng <hidden> · 2020-09-21
Re: [PATCH v12 1/8] x86/cet/ibt: Add Kconfig option for user-mode Indirect Branch Tracking · Pavel Machek <hidden> · 2020-09-21
[PATCH v12 7/8] x86/vdso: Insert endbr32/endbr64 to vDSO · Yu-cheng Yu <hidden> · 2020-09-18
[PATCH v12 6/8] x86/vdso/32: Add ENDBR32 to __kernel_vsyscall entry point · Yu-cheng Yu <hidden> · 2020-09-18

From: Dave Hansen <hidden>
Date: 2020-09-18 19:33:13
Also in: linux-arch, linux-doc, linux-mm, lkml

On 9/18/20 12:23 PM, Yu-cheng Yu wrote:

Emulation of the legacy vsyscall page is required by some programs
built before 2013.  Newer programs after 2013 don't use it.
Disable vsyscall emulation when Control-flow Enforcement (CET) is
enabled to enhance security.

How does this "enhance security"?

What is the connection between vsyscall emulation and CET?

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