Thread (33 messages) 33 messages, 7 authors, 2020-09-23

Re: [PATCH v12 1/8] x86/cet/ibt: Add Kconfig option for user-mode Indirect Branch Tracking

From: Randy Dunlap <hidden>
Date: 2020-09-18 20:24:58
Also in: linux-arch, linux-doc, linux-mm, lkml

Hi,

If you do another version of this:

On 9/18/20 12:23 PM, Yu-cheng Yu wrote:
quoted hunk ↗ jump to hunk
Introduce Kconfig option X86_INTEL_BRANCH_TRACKING_USER.

Indirect Branch Tracking (IBT) provides protection against CALL-/JMP-
oriented programming attacks.  It is active when the kernel has this
feature enabled, and the processor and the application support it.
When this feature is enabled, legacy non-IBT applications continue to
work, but without IBT protection.

Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <redacted>
---
v10:
- Change build-time CET check to config depends on.

 arch/x86/Kconfig | 16 ++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index 6b6dad011763..b047e0a8d1c2 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -1963,6 +1963,22 @@ config X86_INTEL_SHADOW_STACK_USER
 
 	  If unsure, say y.
 
+config X86_INTEL_BRANCH_TRACKING_USER
+	prompt "Intel Indirect Branch Tracking for user-mode"
+	def_bool n
+	depends on CPU_SUP_INTEL && X86_64
+	depends on $(cc-option,-fcf-protection)
+	select X86_INTEL_CET
+	help
+	  Indirect Branch Tracking (IBT) provides protection against
+	  CALL-/JMP-oriented programming attacks.  It is active when
+	  the kernel has this feature enabled, and the processor and
+	  the application support it.  When this feature is enabled,
+	  legacy non-IBT applications continue to work, but without
+	  IBT protection.
+
+	  If unsure, say y
	  If unsure, say y.
+
 config EFI
 	bool "EFI runtime service support"
 	depends on ACPI

-- 
~Randy
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