Re: [PATCH v4 14/16] ext4: add basic fs-verity support
From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Date: 2019-06-18 23:41:39
Also in:
linux-ext4, linux-f2fs-devel, linux-fscrypt, linux-fsdevel, linux-integrity
On Tue, Jun 18, 2019 at 06:46:15PM -0400, Theodore Ts'o wrote:
On Tue, Jun 18, 2019 at 10:51:18AM -0700, Eric Biggers wrote:quoted
On Sat, Jun 15, 2019 at 11:31:12AM -0400, Theodore Ts'o wrote:quoted
On Thu, Jun 06, 2019 at 08:52:03AM -0700, Eric Biggers wrote:quoted
+/* + * Format of ext4 verity xattr. This points to the location of the verity + * descriptor within the file data rather than containing it directly because + * the verity descriptor *must* be encrypted when ext4 encryption is used. But, + * ext4 encryption does not encrypt xattrs. + */ +struct fsverity_descriptor_location { + __le32 version; + __le32 size; + __le64 pos; +};What's the benefit of storing the location in an xattr as opposed to just keying it off the end of i_size, rounded up to next page size (or 64k) as I had suggested earlier? Using an xattr burns xattr space, which is a limited resource, and it adds some additional code complexity. Does the benefits outweigh the added complexity? - TedIt means that only the fs/verity/ support layer has to be aware of the format of the fsverity_descriptor, and the filesystem can just treat it an as opaque blob. Otherwise the filesystem would need to read the first 'sizeof(struct fsverity_descriptor)' bytes and use those to calculate the size as 'sizeof(struct fsverity_descriptor) + le32_to_cpu(desc.sig_size)', then read the rest. Is this what you have in mind?So right now, the way enable_verity() works is that it appends the Merkle tree to the data file, rounding up to the next page (but we might change so we round up to the next 64k boundary). Then it calls end_enable_verity(), which is a file system specific function, passing in the descriptor and the descriptor size. Today ext4 and f2fs appends the descriptor after the Merkle, and then sets the xattr containing the fsverity_descriptor_location. Correct?
That's all correct, except that enable_verity() itself doesn't know or care that the Merkle tree is being appended to the file. That's up to the ->write_merkle_tree_block() and ->read_merkle_tree_page() methods which are filesystem-specific.
What I'm suggesting that ext4 do instead is that it appends the descriptor to the Merkle tree, and then assuming that there is the (descriptor size % block_size) is less than PAGE_SIZE-4, we can write the descriptor size into the last 4 bytes of the last block in the file. If there is not enough space at the end of the descriptor, then we append a block to the file, and then write the descriptor_size into last 4 bytes of that block. When ext4 needs to find the descriptor, it simply reads the last block from the file, reads it into the page cache, reads the last 4 bytes from that block to fetch the descriptor size, and it can use the logical offset of the last block and the descriptor size to calculate the beginning offset of the descriptor size. We can then fake up the fsverity_descriptor_location structure, and pass that into fsverity. It does add a bit of extra complexity, but 99.9% of the time, it requires no extra space. The last 0.098% of the time, the file size will grow by 4k, but if we can avoid spilling over to an external xattr block, it will all be worth it. And in the V1 version of the fsverity code, I had already written the code to descend the extent tree to find the last logical block in the extent tree.
I don't think your proposed solution is so simple. By definition the last extent ends on a filesystem block boundary, while the Merkle tree ends on a Merkle tree block boundary. In the future we might support the case where these differ, so we don't want to preclude that in the on-disk format we choose now. Therefore, just storing the desc_size isn't enough; we'd actually have to store (desc_pos, desc_size), like I'm doing in the xattr. Also, using ext4_find_extent() to find the last mapped block (as the v1 and v2 patchsets did) assumes the file actually uses extents. So we'd have to forbid non-extents based files as a special case, as the v2 patchset did. We'd also have to find a way to implement the same functionality on f2fs (which should be possible, but it seems it would require some new code; there's nothing like f2fs_get_extent()) unless we did something different for f2fs. Note that on Android devices (the motivating use case for fs-verity), the xattrs of user data files on ext4 already spill into an external xattr block, due to the fscrypt and SELinux xattrs. If/when people actually start caring about this, they'll need to increase the inode size to 512 bytes anyway, in which case there will be plenty of space for a few more in-line xattrs. So I don't think we should jump through too many hoops to avoid using an xattr.
quoted
It's also somewhat nice to have the version number in the xattr, in case we ever introduce a new fs-verity format for ext4 or f2fs.We already have a version number in the fsverity descriptor. Surely that is what we would bump if we need to itnroduce a new fs-verity format?
I'm talking about if we ever wanted to make a filesystem-specific change to where the verity metadata is stored. That's what the version number in the filesystem-specific xattr is for. The version number in the fsverity_descriptor is different: that's for if we made a change to fs-verity for *all* filesystems. We hopefully won't ever need the filesystem-specific version number, but as long as we have to store the (desc_pos, desc_size) anyway, I think it's wise to add a version number just in case; it doesn't really cost anything. - Eric