On Thu, Jun 06, 2019 at 08:51:59AM -0700, Eric Biggers wrote:
From: Eric Biggers <redacted>
Add a function for filesystems to call to implement the
FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY ioctl. This ioctl enables fs-verity on a file.
See the "FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY" section of
Documentation/filesystems/fsverity.rst for the documentation.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <redacted>
quoted hunk ↗ jump to hunk
diff --git a/fs/verity/enable.c b/fs/verity/enable.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..7e7ef9d3c376
--- /dev/null
+++ b/fs/verity/enable.c
+ /* Tell the filesystem to finish enabling verity on the file */
+ err = vops->end_enable_verity(filp, desc, desc_size, params.tree_size);
+ if (err) {
+ fsverity_err(inode, "%ps() failed with err %d",
+ vops->end_enable_verity, err);
+ fsverity_free_info(vi);
+ } else {
+ /* Successfully enabled verity */
+
+ WARN_ON(!IS_VERITY(inode));
+
+ /*
+ * Readers can start using ->i_verity_info immediately, so it
+ * can't be rolled back once set. So don't set it until just
+ * after the filesystem has successfully enabled verity.
+ */
+ fsverity_set_info(inode, vi);
+ }
If end_enable_Verity() retuns success, and IS_VERITY is not set, I
would think that we should report the error via fsverity_err() and
return an error to userspace, and *not* call fsverity_set_info(). I
don't think the stack trace printed by WARN_ON is going to very
interesting, since the call path which gets us to enable_verity() is
not going to be surprising.
quoted hunk ↗ jump to hunk
+
+ if (inode->i_size <= 0) {
+ err = -EINVAL;
+ goto out_unlock;
+ }
How hard would it be to support fsverity for zero-length files? There
would be no Merkle tree, but there still would be an fsverity header
file on which we can calculate a checksum for the digital signature.
- Ted