Re: [RFC PATCH v2 16/27] mm: Modify can_follow_write_pte/pmd for shadow stack
From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Date: 2018-07-17 23:12:06
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On 07/17/2018 04:03 PM, Yu-cheng Yu wrote:
quoted hunk ↗ jump to hunk
On Fri, 2018-07-13 at 11:26 -0700, Dave Hansen wrote:quoted
On 07/11/2018 10:05 AM, Yu-cheng Yu wrote:quoted
My understanding is that we don't want to follow write pte if the page is shared as read-only. For a SHSTK page, that is (R/O + DIRTY_SW), which means the SHSTK page has not been COW'ed. Is that right?Let's look at the code again:quoted
-static inline bool can_follow_write_pte(pte_t pte, unsigned int flags) +static inline bool can_follow_write_pte(pte_t pte, unsigned int flags, + bool shstk) { + bool pte_cowed = shstk ? is_shstk_pte(pte):pte_dirty(pte); + return pte_write(pte) || - ((flags & FOLL_FORCE) && (flags & FOLL_COW) && pte_dirty(pte)); + ((flags & FOLL_FORCE) && (flags & FOLL_COW) && pte_cowed); }This is another case where the naming of pte_*() is biting us vs. the perversion of the PTE bits. The lack of comments and explanation inthe patch is compounding the confusion. We need to find a way to differentiate "someone can write to this PTE" from "the write bit is set in this PTE". In this particular hunk, we need to make it clear that pte_write() is *never* true for shadowstack PTEs. In other words, shadow stack VMAs will (should?) never even *see* a pte_write() PTE. I think this is a case where you just need to bite the bullet and bifurcate can_follow_write_pte(). Just separate the shadowstack and non-shadowstack parts.In case I don't understand the exact issue. What about the following.diff --git a/mm/gup.c b/mm/gup.c index fc5f98069f4e..45a0837b27f9 100644 --- a/mm/gup.c +++ b/mm/gup.c@@ -70,6 +70,12 @@ static inline bool can_follow_write_pte(pte_t pte, unsigned int flags)((flags & FOLL_FORCE) && (flags & FOLL_COW) && pte_dirty(pte)); } +static inline bool can_follow_write_shstk_pte(pte_t pte, unsigned int flags) +{ + return ((flags & FOLL_FORCE) && (flags & FOLL_COW) && + is_shstk_pte(pte)); +} + static struct page *follow_page_pte(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long address, pmd_t *pmd, unsigned int flags) {@@ -105,9 +111,16 @@ static struct page *follow_page_pte(struct vm_area_struct *vma,} if ((flags & FOLL_NUMA) && pte_protnone(pte)) goto no_page; - if ((flags & FOLL_WRITE) && !can_follow_write_pte(pte, flags)) { - pte_unmap_unlock(ptep, ptl); - return NULL; + if (flags & FOLL_WRITE) { + if (is_shstk_mapping(vma->vm_flags)) { + if (!can_follow_write_shstk_pte(pte, flags)) { + pte_unmap_unlock(ptep, ptl); + return NULL; + } + } else if (!can_follow_write_pte(pte, flags) { + pte_unmap_unlock(ptep, ptl); + return NULL; + }
That looks pretty horrible. :(
We need:
bool can_follow_write(vma, pte_t pte, unsigned int flags)
{
if (!is_shstk_mapping(vma->vm_flags)) {
// vanilla case here
} else {
// shadowstack case here
}
}