Re: [PATCH V2 06/12] virtio_pci: harden MSI-X interrupts
From: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>
Date: 2021-10-20 06:56:36
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On Wed, Oct 20, 2021 at 09:33:49AM +0800, Jason Wang wrote:
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In my own opinion, the threat model is: Attacker: 'malicious' hypervisor Victim: VM with SEV/TDX/SGX The attacker should not be able to steal secure/private data from VM, when the hypervisor's action is unexpected. DoS is out of the scope. My concern is: it is very hard to clearly explain in the patchset how the hypervisor is able to steal VM's data, by setting queue=0 or injecting unwanted interrupts to VM.Yes, it's a hard question but instead of trying to answer that, we can just fix the case of e.g unexpected interrupts. Thanks
I think this it's still early days for TDX. So it's a bit early to talk about threat models, start opening CVEs and distinguishing between security and non-security bugs. -- MST _______________________________________________ Virtualization mailing list Virtualization@lists.linux-foundation.org https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/virtualization