On Wed, Oct 20, 2021 at 09:33:49AM +0800, Jason Wang wrote:

quoted

In my own opinion, the threat model is:

Attacker: 'malicious' hypervisor

Victim: VM with SEV/TDX/SGX

The attacker should not be able to steal secure/private data from VM, when the
hypervisor's action is unexpected. DoS is out of the scope.

My concern is: it is very hard to clearly explain in the patchset how the
hypervisor is able to steal VM's data, by setting queue=0 or injecting unwanted
interrupts to VM.

Yes, it's a hard question but instead of trying to answer that, we can
just fix the case of e.g unexpected interrupts.

Thanks

I think this it's still early days for TDX. So it's a bit early to talk
about threat models, start opening CVEs and distinguishing between
security and non-security bugs.

-- 
MST

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