Re: [PATCH net-next v5 02/12] net: airoha: Reserve RX headroom to avoid skb reallocation
From: Lorenzo Bianconi <lorenzo@kernel.org>
Date: 2026-05-11 08:13:33
Also in:
linux-devicetree, sashiko
On May 10, sashiko-bot@kernel.org wrote:
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider: - [High] Missing bounds check adjustment for RX packet length allows buffer overflows -- commit f34e8812cb62dd63f96801a39b0d65ee905cd258 Author: Lorenzo Bianconi [off-list ref] net: airoha: Reserve RX headroom to avoid skb reallocation This commit reserves NET_SKB_PAD + NET_IP_ALIGN bytes of headroom for received packets to avoid skb head reallocation when pushing protocol headers into the skb.quoted
diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/airoha/airoha_eth.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/airoha/airoha_eth.c --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/airoha/airoha_eth.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/airoha/airoha_eth.c[ ... ]quoted
@@ -627,10 +629,12 @@ static int airoha_qdma_rx_process(struct airoha_queue *q, int budget) port = eth->ports[p]; if (!q->skb) { /* first buffer */ - q->skb = napi_build_skb(e->buf, q->buf_size); + q->skb = napi_build_skb(e->buf - AIROHA_RX_HEADROOM, + q->buf_size); if (!q->skb) goto free_frag; + skb_reserve(q->skb, AIROHA_RX_HEADROOM); __skb_put(q->skb, len);Does this code overlook adjusting the bounds check for the RX packet length? Earlier in airoha_qdma_rx_process(), the software validation check uses the unadjusted lengths: data_len = q->skb ? q->buf_size : SKB_WITH_OVERHEAD(q->buf_size); if (!len || data_len < len) goto free_frag; If the hardware descriptor returns a len that is larger than the newly adjusted dma_len but smaller than or equal to the old data_len, the check will pass. Since skb_reserve() shifts the skb->tail forward by AIROHA_RX_HEADROOM, will calling __skb_put(q->skb, len) with this unvalidated oversized len push skb->tail past skb->end and overflow the skb_shared_info structure? Similarly for scattered fragments, could an oversized len passed to skb_add_rx_frag() cause out-of-bounds memory accesses beyond the allocated page fragment?
ack, I will fix it in v6. Regards, Lorenzo
-- Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260509-airoha-eth-multi-serdes-v5-0-805e38edc2aa@kernel.org?part=2
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