From: Dan Carpenter <redacted>
Date: Tue, 14 Jan 2025 13:45:04 +0300

[ I tried to send this email yesterday but apparently gmail blocked
  it for security reasons?  So weird. - dan ]

On Mon, Jan 13, 2025 at 01:32:11PM +0100, Alexander Lobakin wrote:

quoted

From: Dan Carpenter <redacted>
Date: Mon, 13 Jan 2025 09:18:39 +0300

quoted

The "sizeof(struct cmsg_bpf_event) + pkt_size + data_size" math could
potentially have an integer wrapping bug on 32bit systems.  Check for

Not in practice I suppose? Do we need to fix "never" bugs?

No, this is from static analysis.  We don't need to fix never bugs.

This is called from nfp_bpf_ctrl_msg_rx() and nfp_bpf_ctrl_msg_rx_raw()
and I assumed that since pkt_size and data_size come from skb->data on
the rx path then they couldn't be trusted.

skbs are always valid and skb->len could never cross INT_MAX to provoke
an overflow.

Where is the bounds checking?

regards,
dan carpenter

Thanks,
Olek