Thread (22 messages) read the whole thread 22 messages, 5 authors, 2025-01-08

Re: [syzbot] [mptcp?] general protection fault in proc_scheduler

From: Matthieu Baerts <matttbe@kernel.org>
Date: 2025-01-06 15:34:43
Also in: lkml, mptcp

Hi Eric,

Thank you for your reply!

On 06/01/2025 16:27, Eric Dumazet wrote:
On Mon, Jan 6, 2025 at 3:27 PM Matthieu Baerts [off-list ref] wrote:
quoted
Hi Joel, Eric, Al,

On 06/01/2025 14:32, Joel Granados wrote:
quoted
On Sat, Jan 04, 2025 at 08:11:52PM +0100, Matthieu Baerts wrote:
quoted
Hi Eric,

(+cc Joel)

Thank you for your reply!

On 04/01/2025 19:53, Eric Dumazet wrote:
quoted
On Sat, Jan 4, 2025 at 7:38 PM Matthieu Baerts [off-list ref] wrote:
quoted
Hi Eric,

Thank you for the bug report!

On 02/01/2025 16:21, Eric Dumazet wrote:
quoted
On Thu, Jan 2, 2025 at 3:12 PM syzbot
[off-list ref] wrote:
quoted
Hello,

syzbot found the following issue on:

HEAD commit:    ccb98ccef0e5 Merge tag 'platform-drivers-x86-v6.13-4' of g..
git tree:       upstream
console output: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/log.txt?x=128f6ac4580000
kernel config:  https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/.config?x=86dd15278dbfe19f
dashboard link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=e364f774c6f57f2c86d1
compiler:       gcc (Debian 12.2.0-14) 12.2.0, GNU ld (GNU Binutils for Debian) 2.40
syz repro:      https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.syz?x=1245eaf8580000

Downloadable assets:
disk image: https://storage.googleapis.com/syzbot-assets/d24eb225cff7/disk-ccb98cce.raw.xz
vmlinux: https://storage.googleapis.com/syzbot-assets/dd81532f8240/vmlinux-ccb98cce.xz
kernel image: https://storage.googleapis.com/syzbot-assets/18b08e4bbf40/bzImage-ccb98cce.xz

IMPORTANT: if you fix the issue, please add the following tag to the commit:
Reported-by: syzbot+e364f774c6f57f2c86d1@syzkaller.appspotmail.com

Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000005: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000028-0x000000000000002f]
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 5924 Comm: syz-executor Not tainted 6.13.0-rc5-syzkaller-00004-gccb98ccef0e5 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 09/13/2024
RIP: 0010:proc_scheduler+0xc6/0x3c0 net/mptcp/ctrl.c:125
Code: 03 42 80 3c 38 00 0f 85 fe 02 00 00 4d 8b a4 24 08 09 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 49 8d 7c 24 28 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 cc 02 00 00 4d 8b 7c 24 28 48 8d 84 24 c8 00 00
RSP: 0018:ffffc900034774e8 EFLAGS: 00010206

RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 1ffff9200068ee9e RCX: ffffc90003477620
RDX: 0000000000000005 RSI: ffffffff8b08f91e RDI: 0000000000000028
RBP: 0000000000000001 R08: ffffc90003477710 R09: 0000000000000040
R10: 0000000000000040 R11: 00000000726f7475 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: ffffc90003477620 R14: ffffc90003477710 R15: dffffc0000000000
FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8880b8700000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007fee3cd452d8 CR3: 000000007d116000 CR4: 00000000003526f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 proc_sys_call_handler+0x403/0x5d0 fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c:601
 __kernel_write_iter+0x318/0xa80 fs/read_write.c:612
 __kernel_write+0xf6/0x140 fs/read_write.c:632
 do_acct_process+0xcb0/0x14a0 kernel/acct.c:539
 acct_pin_kill+0x2d/0x100 kernel/acct.c:192
 pin_kill+0x194/0x7c0 fs/fs_pin.c:44
 mnt_pin_kill+0x61/0x1e0 fs/fs_pin.c:81
 cleanup_mnt+0x3ac/0x450 fs/namespace.c:1366
 task_work_run+0x14e/0x250 kernel/task_work.c:239
 exit_task_work include/linux/task_work.h:43 [inline]
 do_exit+0xad8/0x2d70 kernel/exit.c:938
 do_group_exit+0xd3/0x2a0 kernel/exit.c:1087
 get_signal+0x2576/0x2610 kernel/signal.c:3017
 arch_do_signal_or_restart+0x90/0x7e0 arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:337
 exit_to_user_mode_loop kernel/entry/common.c:111 [inline]
 exit_to_user_mode_prepare include/linux/entry-common.h:329 [inline]
 __syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work kernel/entry/common.c:207 [inline]
 syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x150/0x2a0 kernel/entry/common.c:218
 do_syscall_64+0xda/0x250 arch/x86/entry/common.c:89
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7fee3cb87a6a
Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at 0x7fee3cb87a40.
RSP: 002b:00007fffcccac688 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000037
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 00007fffcccac710 RCX: 00007fee3cb87a6a
RDX: 0000000000000041 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 0000000000000003 R08: 00007fffcccac6ac R09: 00007fffcccacac7
R10: 00007fffcccac710 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 00007fee3cd49500
R13: 00007fffcccac6ac R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 00007fee3cd4b000
 </TASK>
Modules linked in:
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
RIP: 0010:proc_scheduler+0xc6/0x3c0 net/mptcp/ctrl.c:125
Code: 03 42 80 3c 38 00 0f 85 fe 02 00 00 4d 8b a4 24 08 09 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 49 8d 7c 24 28 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 cc 02 00 00 4d 8b 7c 24 28 48 8d 84 24 c8 00 00
RSP: 0018:ffffc900034774e8 EFLAGS: 00010206
RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 1ffff9200068ee9e RCX: ffffc90003477620
RDX: 0000000000000005 RSI: ffffffff8b08f91e RDI: 0000000000000028
RBP: 0000000000000001 R08: ffffc90003477710 R09: 0000000000000040
R10: 0000000000000040 R11: 00000000726f7475 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: ffffc90003477620 R14: ffffc90003477710 R15: dffffc0000000000
FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8880b8700000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007fee3cd452d8 CR3: 000000007d116000 CR4: 00000000003526f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
----------------
Code disassembly (best guess), 1 bytes skipped:
   0:   42 80 3c 38 00          cmpb   $0x0,(%rax,%r15,1)
   5:   0f 85 fe 02 00 00       jne    0x309
   b:   4d 8b a4 24 08 09 00    mov    0x908(%r12),%r12
  12:   00
  13:   48 b8 00 00 00 00 00    movabs $0xdffffc0000000000,%rax
  1a:   fc ff df
  1d:   49 8d 7c 24 28          lea    0x28(%r12),%rdi
  22:   48 89 fa                mov    %rdi,%rdx
  25:   48 c1 ea 03             shr    $0x3,%rdx
* 29:   80 3c 02 00             cmpb   $0x0,(%rdx,%rax,1) <-- trapping instruction
  2d:   0f 85 cc 02 00 00       jne    0x2ff
  33:   4d 8b 7c 24 28          mov    0x28(%r12),%r15
  38:   48                      rex.W
  39:   8d                      .byte 0x8d
  3a:   84 24 c8                test   %ah,(%rax,%rcx,8)
(...)
quoted
I thought acct(2) was only allowing regular files.

acct_on() indeed has :

if (!S_ISREG(file_inode(file)->i_mode)) {
    kfree(acct);
    filp_close(file, NULL);
    return -EACCES;
}

It seems there are other ways to call do_acct_process() targeting a sysfs file ?
If this is the case, can you point me to the place where this happens?
quoted
quoted
quoted
Just to be sure I'm not misunderstanding your comment: do you mean that
here, the issue is *not* in MPTCP code where we get the 'struct net'
pointer via 'current->nsproxy->net_ns', but in the FS part, right?

Here, we have an issue because 'current->nsproxy' is NULL, but is it
normal? Or should we simply exit with an error if it is the case because
we are in an exiting phase?

I'm just a bit confused, because it looks like 'net' is retrieved from
different places elsewhere when dealing with sysfs: some get it from
'current' like us, some assign 'net' to 'table->extra2', others get it
from 'table->data' (via a container_of()), etc. Maybe we should not use
'current->nsproxy->net_ns' here then?
I do think this is a bug in process accounting, not in networking.

It might make sense to output a record on a regular file, but probably
not on any other files.
It for sure does not make sense to output a record on a sysctl file that
has a maxlen of just 3*sizeof(int) (kernel/acct.c:79).
quoted
quoted
diff --git a/kernel/acct.c b/kernel/acct.c
index 179848ad33e978a557ce695a0d6020aa169177c6..a211305cb930f6860d02de7f45ebd260ae03a604
100644
--- a/kernel/acct.c
+++ b/kernel/acct.c
@@ -495,6 +495,9 @@ static void do_acct_process(struct bsd_acct_struct *acct)
        const struct cred *orig_cred;
        struct file *file = acct->file;

+       if (S_ISREG(file_inode(file)->i_mode))
+               return;
+
This seems like it does not handle the actual culprit which is. Why is
the sysctl file being used for the accounting.
quoted
quoted
        /*
         * Accounting records are not subject to resource limits.
         */
OK, thank you, that's clearer.

So this is then more a question for Joel, right?

Do you plan to send this patch to him?

#syz set subsystems: fs

Cheers,
Matt
--
Sponsored by the NGI0 Core fund.
So what is happening is that:
1. The accounting file is set to a non-sysctl file.
2. And when accounting tries to write to this file, you get the
   behaviour explained in this mail?

Please correct me if I have miss-read the situation.
@Joel: Thank you for your reply!

I'm sorry, I'm not sure whether I can help here. I hope Eric and/or Al
can jump in.

What I can say is that the original issue has been found by syzbot, and
the reproducer [1] shows that 3 syscalls have been used:
- openat('/proc/sys/net/mptcp/scheduler')
- mprotect()
- acct()

Please also note that the conversation continued in a sub-tread where
you are not in the Cc list, see [2]. In short, Eric suggested another
patch only for sysfs, and Al recommended dropping the use of
'current->nsproxy'.

On my side, I'm looking at dropping the use of 'current->nsproxy' in
sysctl callbacks. I guess such patches will be seen as fixes, except if
Eric's new patch is enough for stable?
It might be less risky in terms of backports to patch mptcp and others.

Ie just use Al suggestion.
Thank you, will do! In fact, I already modified the kernel on my side,
but it is hard for me to validate that for the moment: it is nice to
have many trees around, but less when they fall on cables :)

Cheers,
Matt
-- 
Sponsored by the NGI0 Core fund.
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