Re: [PATCH net-next 5/8] net: dsa: rtl8366: Disable "4K" VLANs
From: Linus Walleij <hidden>
Date: 2021-09-13 23:20:50
Hi Vladimir, first, thanks for your help and patience. I learned a lot the recent weeks, much thanks to your questions and explanations! On Mon, Sep 13, 2021 at 5:34 PM Vladimir Oltean [off-list ref] wrote:
quoted
This was discovered when testing with OpenWrt that join the LAN ports lan0 ... lan3 into a bridge and then assign each of them into VLAN 1 with PVID set on each port: without this patch this will not work and the bridge goes numb.It is important to explain _why_ the switch will go "numb" and not pass packets if the Linux bridge assigns all ports to VLAN ID 1 as pvid. It is certainly not expected for that to happen.
Yeah it is pretty weird. What happens now is that this is a regression when using OpenWrt userspace as it sets up the VLANs like this, but if I boot a clean system and just manually do e.g. ifconfig lan0 169.254.1.2 netmask 255.255.255.0 up it works fine because the default VLANs that were set up by the driver (removed by patch 2/8) will tag all packets using PVID and send packets on 5 ingress and 1 egress VLANs.
The purpose of the PVID feature is specifically to classify untagged packets to a port-based VLAN ID. So "everything is a VLAN" even for Linux user space, not sure what you're talking about.
I think what happens is that OpenWrts userspace sets VLAN 1 for all ingress ports with PVID, so all packets from ingress ports get tagged nicely with VID 1. But as the CPU port is hidden inside the bridge it can't join the CPU port into that VLAN (userspace does not know it exist I think?) and thus no packets can go into or out of the CPU port. But you can still pass packets between the lan ports.
When the Linux bridge has the vlan_filtering attribute set to 1, the hardware should follow suit by making untagged packets get classified to the VLAN ID that the software bridge wants to see, on the ports that are members of that bridge.
This is what it does, I think. But the "4K" VLAN feature is so strict that it will restrict also the CPU port from this (in hardware) with no way to turn it off. It seems the "4K" mode is a "VLAN with filtering only mode" so no matter whether we turned on filtering or not, the CPU port will not see any packets from any other ports unless we add also that port (port 5) into the VLAN. One solution I could try would be to just add the CPU port to all VLANs by default, but .. is that right? I suppose this would work as software will add the right VID to the packets so they will only propagate to the right ports anyway. It could test it.
When the Linux bridge has the vlan_filtering attribute set to 0, the software bridge very much ignores any VLAN tags from packets, and does not perform any VLAN-based ingress admission checks. If the hardware classifies all packets to a VLAN even when VLAN "filtering" (i.e. ingress dropping on mismatch) is disabled, that is perfectly fine too,
I think this is what happens in this hardware.
although the software bridge doesn't care. You need to set up a private VLAN ID for your VLAN-unaware ports, and make it the pvid on those ports,
Would the CPU port be a VLAN-unaware port? My problem is that in the "4K" mode, the CPU port will not see packets from any VLAN it is not a member of.
and somehow force the hardware to classify any packet towards that pvid
on those VLAN-unaware ports, regardless of whether the packets are
untagged or 802.1Q-tagged or 802.1ad-tagged or whatever. That is simply
the way things are supposed to work.
VLAN ID 0 and 4095 are good candidates to use privately within your
driver as the pvid on VLAN-unaware ports, and you can/must manually
bring up these VLANs, since the bridge will refuse to install these
VLANs in its database.
Other VLAN IDs like the range 4000-4094 are also potentially ok as long
as you document the fact that your driver crops that range out of the
usable range of the bridge, and you make sure that no packet leaks
inside or outside of those private VLANs are possible ("attackers" could
still try to send a packet tagged with VLAN ID 4094 towards a port that
is under a VLAN-aware bridge. Since that port is VLAN-aware, it will
recognize the VLAN ID as 4094, so unless you configure that port to drop
VLAN ID 4094, it might well leak into the VLAN domain 4094 which is
privately used by your driver to ensure VLAN-unaware forwarding between
the ports of a nearby VLAN-unaware bridge.I don't have any VLAN-unaware ports other than the CPU port. What happened before patch 2/8 was that it was given its own VLAN with PVID and all other ports were assigned members of that VLAN as well, and thus egress traffic from the CPU port could go out. For ingress traffic, the CPU port was member of all ingress VLANs. (Also removed by patch 2/8)
I know there are lots of things to think about, but this patch is way too simplistic and does not really offer solid explanations.
I'm trying my best and learning along the way :) It's fine, no hurry and let's get this right so that the other RTL switches can look at this a good example. Yours, Linus Walleij