Re: [PATCH v5 2/2] KEYS: Avoid false positive ENOMEM error on key read
From: Jarkko Sakkinen <hidden>
Date: 2020-03-20 14:35:54
Also in:
keyrings, linux-integrity, linux-security-module, lkml
On Fri, Mar 20, 2020 at 09:27:03AM -0400, Waiman Long wrote:
On 3/19/20 10:07 PM, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:quoted
On Thu, Mar 19, 2020 at 08:07:55PM -0400, Waiman Long wrote:quoted
On 3/19/20 3:46 PM, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:quoted
On Wed, Mar 18, 2020 at 06:14:57PM -0400, Waiman Long wrote:quoted
+ * It is possible, though unlikely, that the key + * changes in between the up_read->down_read period. + * If the key becomes longer, we will have to + * allocate a larger buffer and redo the key read + * again. + */ + if (!tmpbuf || unlikely(ret > tmpbuflen)) {Shouldn't you check that tmpbuflen stays below buflen (why else you had made copy of buflen otherwise)?The check above this thunk: if ((ret > 0) && (ret <= buflen)) { will make sure that ret will not be larger than buflen. So tmpbuflen > >> will never be bigger than buflen. > > Ah right, of course, thanks.What would go wrong if the condition was instead ((ret > 0) && (ret <= tmpbuflen))?That if statement is a check to see if the actual key length is longer than the user-supplied buffer (buflen). If that is the case, it will just return the expected length without storing anything into the user buffer. For the case that buflen >= ret > tmpbuflen, the revised check above will incorrectly skip the storing step causing the caller to incorrectly think the key is there in the buffer. Maybe I should clarify that a bit more in the comment.
OK, right because it is possible in-between tmpbuflen could be larger. Got it. I think that longish key_data and key_data_len would be better names than tmpbuf and tpmbuflen. Also the comments are somewat overkill IMHO. I'd replace them along the lines of /* Cap the user supplied buffer length to PAGE_SIZE. */ /* Key data can change as we don not hold key->sem. */ /Jarkko