[PATCH net 0/4] tcp: make sack processing more robust

Jonathan Looney brought to our attention multiple problems
in TCP stack at the sender side.

SACK processing can be abused by malicious peers to either
cause overflows, or increase of memory usage.

First two patches fix the immediate problems.

Since the malicious peers abuse senders by advertizing a very
small MSS in their SYN or SYNACK packet, the last two
patches add a new sysctl so that admins can chose a higher
limit for MSS clamping.

Eric Dumazet (4):
  tcp: limit payload size of sacked skbs
  tcp: tcp_fragment() should apply sane memory limits
  tcp: add tcp_min_snd_mss sysctl
  tcp: enforce tcp_min_snd_mss in tcp_mtu_probing()

 Documentation/networking/ip-sysctl.txt |  8 ++++++++
 include/linux/tcp.h                    |  4 ++++
 include/net/netns/ipv4.h               |  1 +
 include/net/tcp.h                      |  2 ++
 include/uapi/linux/snmp.h              |  1 +
 net/ipv4/proc.c                        |  1 +
 net/ipv4/sysctl_net_ipv4.c             | 11 +++++++++++
 net/ipv4/tcp.c                         |  1 +
 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c                   | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++------
 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c                    |  1 +
 net/ipv4/tcp_output.c                  | 10 +++++++---
 net/ipv4/tcp_timer.c                   |  1 +
 12 files changed, 58 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)

-- 
2.22.0.410.gd8fdbe21b5-goog