Thread (73 messages) flat view 73 messages, 13 authors, 2018-02-22

Re: [PATCH RFC 0/4] net: add bpfilter

From: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Date: 2018-02-16 15:00:51
Also in: netfilter-devel

Daniel Borkmann [off-list ref] wrote:
This is a very rough and early proof of concept that implements bpfilter.
[..]
Also, as a benefit from such design, we get BPF JIT compilation on x86_64,
arm64, ppc64, sparc64, mips64, s390x and arm32, but also rule offloading
into HW for free for Netronome NFP SmartNICs that are already capable of
offloading BPF since we can reuse all existing BPF infrastructure as the
back end. The user space iptables binary issuing rule addition or dumps was
left as-is, thus at some point any binaries against iptables uapi kernel
interface could transparently be supported in such manner in long term.

As rule translation can potentially become very complex, this is performed
entirely in user space. In order to ease deployment, request_module() code
is extended to allow user mode helpers to be invoked. Idea is that user mode
helpers are built as part of the kernel build and installed as traditional
kernel modules with .ko file extension into distro specified location,
such that from a distribution point of view, they are no different than
regular kernel modules. Thus, allow request_module() logic to load such
user mode helper (umh) binaries via:

  request_module("foo") ->
    call_umh("modprobe foo") ->
      sys_finit_module(FD of /lib/modules/.../foo.ko) ->
        call_umh(struct file)

Such approach enables kernel to delegate functionality traditionally done
by kernel modules into user space processes (either root or !root) and
reduces security attack surface of such new code, meaning in case of
potential bugs only the umh would crash but not the kernel. Another
advantage coming with that would be that bpfilter.ko can be debugged and
tested out of user space as well (e.g. opening the possibility to run
all clang sanitizers, fuzzers or test suites for checking translation).
Several questions spinning at the moment, I will probably come up with
more:
1. Does this still attach the binary blob to the 'normal' iptables
   hooks?
2. If yes, do you see issues wrt. 'iptables' and 'bpfilter' attached
programs being different in nature (e.g. changed by different entities)?
3. What happens if the rule can't be translated (yet?)
4. Do you plan to reimplement connection tracking in userspace?
If no, how will the bpf program interact with it?
[ same question applies to ipv6 exthdr traversal, ip defragmentation
and the like ].

I will probably have a quadrillion of followup questions, sorry :-/
Also, such architecture makes the kernel/user boundary very precise,
meaning requests can be handled and BPF translated in control plane part
in user space with its own user memory etc, while minimal data plane
bits are in kernel. It would also allow to remove old xtables modules
at some point from the kernel while keeping functionality in place.
This is what we tried with nftables :-/
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