Re: general protection fault in skb_segment
From: Willem de Bruijn <willemdebruijn.kernel@gmail.com>
Date: 2017-12-31 09:52:58
Also in:
linux-sctp, lkml
It seems virtio_net could use more sanity checks. When PACKET_VNET_HDR
is used, it will end up calling:
tpacket_rcv() {
...
if (do_vnet) {
if (virtio_net_hdr_from_skb(skb, h.raw + macoff -
sizeof(struct virtio_net_hdr),
vio_le(), true)) {
spin_lock(&sk->sk_receive_queue.lock);
goto drop_n_account;
}
}
and virtio_net_hdr_from_skb does:
if (skb_is_gso(skb)) {
...
if (sinfo->gso_type & SKB_GSO_TCPV4)
hdr->gso_type = VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_TCPV4;
else if (sinfo->gso_type & SKB_GSO_TCPV6)
hdr->gso_type = VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_TCPV6;
else
return -EINVAL;That is the receive path, but the send path is analogous. Just adds UFO.
Meaning that any gso_type other than TCP would be rejected, but this SCTP one got through. Seems the header contains a sctp header, but the gso_type set was actually pointing to TCP (otherwise it would have been rejected). AFAICT if this packet had an ESP header, for example, it could have hit esp4_gso_segment. Can you please confirm this?
I have not tested this yet, but it certainly seems plausible. There is nothing ensuring consistency between gso_type and the actual packet contents that are parsed to look up gso callbacks.
I don't know of anywhere in the stack validating if the gso_type matches the header that actually is in there. The fix you mentioned is a good start, we want that one way or another, but I'm afraid this bug is bigger than sctp.
Good point. Packet sockets require CAP_NET_RAW, but this is also taken for virtio, so we probably want more stringent entry tests here. The alternative to harden the segmentation code itself with a gso_type sanity check in every gso callback is more work and fragile. Need to figure out whether a brief check for just TCP or UDP is sufficient or we need a full flow dissector step to support tunnel headers and such.