Re: general protection fault in skb_segment
From: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Date: 2017-12-30 13:51:22
Also in:
linux-sctp, lkml
On Sat, Dec 30, 2017 at 7:54 PM, Willem de Bruijn [off-list ref] wrote:
quoted hunk ↗ jump to hunk
quoted
So this is a packet socket writing something that apparently looks like an SCTP packet, is only 42 bytes long, but has GSO set in its virtio_net_hdr struct. It crashes in skb_segment seemingly on a NULL list_skb. (gdb) list *(skb_segment+0x2a4) 0xffffffff8167cc24 is in skb_segment (net/core/skbuff.c:3566). 3561 if (hsize < 0) 3562 hsize = 0; 3563 if (hsize > len || !sg) 3564 hsize = len; 3565 3566 if (!hsize && i >= nfrags && skb_headlen(list_skb) && 3567 (skb_headlen(list_skb) == len || sg)) { 3568 BUG_ON(skb_headlen(list_skb) > len); 3569 3570 i = 0;It appears to be a packet that consists only of an sctp header. sctp_gso_segment pulls the header before calling skb_segment, after which hsize == skb_headlen(head_skb) == 0 and nfrags == 0. This check avoids the crash, but still triggers an skb_warn_bad_offload on return in __skb_gso_segment@@ -45,6 +45,13 @@ static struct sk_buff *sctp_gso_segment(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sk_buff *segs = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); struct sctphdr *sh; + if (!skb_has_frag_list(skb)) + goto out;
Shouldn't this check be in skb_segment(), right after if (mss ==
GSO_BY_FRAGS), like
if (unlikely(mss == GSO_BY_FRAGS)) {
if (unlikely(!list_skb))
goto err;
len = list_skb->len;
as the fix of commit 3953c46c3ac7 ("sk_buff: allow segmenting based on
frag sizes").